University of Memphis

University of Memphis Digital Commons
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
10-5-2015

A Network Security Game Model
Vivek Mayura Shandilya

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Shandilya, Vivek Mayura, "A Network Security Game Model" (2015). Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
1258.
https://digitalcommons.memphis.edu/etd/1258

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by University of Memphis Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of
Memphis Digital Commons. For more information, please contact khggerty@memphis.edu.

A NETWORK SECURITY GAME MODEL
by
VIVEK MAYURA SHANDILYA

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Computer Science

The University of Memphis
Dec 2015

Copyright ©2015 Vivek Mayura Shandilya
All rights reserved

To
My Parents

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My life was singularly transformed by the magnanimity of Dr. Chikkannaiah, who
initiated my admission process to graduate school. Encouragement from Dr.
Chandrashekhar and support from Mr. Rama Rampur, Dr. T. Chokkalingam, Dr. Ashok
Rao and benefactors helped. I express my sincere thanks to them.
I am fortunate to be accepted as a student, mentored and supported by Dr. Sajjan
Shiva. I appreciate his generous care and painstaking hard work in smoothing my
rough edges, in preparing me for a research career in academia. It was a dream come
true. I express my sincere thanks to him.
I am grateful to my dissertation committee members Dr. Stan Franklin, Dr. Lan
Wang and Dr. Vaile Rus for their feedback, support and accommodating me in their
busy schedules.
I thank my collaborators who helped me to improve. I thank Dr. Aregahegn Negatu,
for his generous support and Prof. Bela Bollobas, Prof. Paul Balister and their group for
their support, in the third and fourth years.
I thank my parents, my family, relatives, teachers, friends and strangers for helping
me. Finally I thank you, the readers.
This is the beginning.

iv

ABSTRACT

Shandilya, Vivek Mayura. Ph.D.. The University of Memphis. December 2015. A
Network Security Game Model. Major Professor: Dr. Sajjan Shiva.
The security systems built to secure the computer network systems have to address
dynamically changing attacks, like Stuxnet computer worm. To build a robust security
system using game theory, a formulation of the generic network security related
activities as a game is the central requirement. A game model capable of fecilitating the
typical security games is needed. The model should provide formal guarantees and
acceptable bounded outcomes to be reliably useful. Such a generic model is a
convenient framework to derive many game models specifically optimized/targeted for
particular attacks.The model when instantiated with the inputs from a security
situation will result in a security game. Given such a game, the favorable equilibrium
can be ’reasonably’ computed, and the corresponding strategy can be identified leading
to the equilibrium. Given the strategy, the corresponding actions/action-sequence at
each state can be identified. Given the actions/action-sequence for the game at each
state, the corresponding computer-network-administrative actions amounting to the
prescribed action in the game could be resolved. Thus, acting according to such a
prescribed protocol, an effective defense can be built against the network attacks. The
main condition for the effectiveness of this system rests on how well the game can
represent iv the security situation. Thus the robust game model presented here
facilitats effective defense. Here, in this dissertation, we present a generic network
security game model. The analyses and design of the model is presented along with the
validation through numerical simulations. We present a framework for the effective
interaction with a suspicious user in a Honeypot. We present the framework for
v

modeling the co-operative actions by multiple adversaries. We present the details of the
deployment of the game model to construct a game model repository in the security
system. Based on these game theoretic solutions, the architecture of a comprehensive
security system is presented with various components. Recently, as most
operations/processes are being configured to operate with the cloud based systems, we
present a formal security model of such systems, so that we can in future address their
security problems using the security systems with the architecture presented here.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Today most of the information and control systems are networks of computational
systems which are connected to other networks with different degrees of security
precautions. The traffic control systems, file servers in a university department, etc are
the typical examples. As the importance of these systems in the functioning of our
societies is increasing, so are the number and severity of damages due to their
malfunctioning. These systems malfunction due to both benign internal errors and
external attacks interfering with and diverting its behavior. In both the cases, the
security of the system is breached and damages are incurred.
Security systems are employed to safeguard these important systems from the
security breaches. The security systems would typically consider the vulnerabilities of
the system and their exploitation history to be ready with security measures done a
priori. These measures in combination with those precautions in the system itself to
protect the valuable assets and important processes in the system constitute the built
in security. These are the precautions against known vulnerabilities being exploited
through known procedures. The other source of malfunction is unforeseen events. The
reasons may be
1

• due to the vulnerability being unknown earlier,

• the procedure to exploit the vulnerabilities being new and did not have
preventive mechanism in place,

• the external attack changed during its operation making it difficult to identify and
prevent,

• and so on.

In each of these cases, the prior knowledge of the system and vulnerabilities, their
possible exploits, the probable intruder behavior and the security measures based on
them in place are not sufficient to protect the system. There must be mechanisms to
keep looking for the anomalies in the system behavior to capture any ongoing situation
and engage with such processes to stop them from doing the progressive damage.
These measures constitute the bolt on security.
The defensive measures for the prior known attacks could be taken if the ongoing
attack is identified early enough during its execution. If the information about the
security situation is not sufficient for doing so, then there is no option but to engage in
the situation to resolve it. To do so when a particular user/ group of users is involved, is
to engage with an adversary with unknown and possibly conflicting interests. There is
an growing interest among the research community, since 2002 [19, 20], to apply game
theory to address such real time computer network security problems.

1.1 The Framework
In network systems, many sensors are designed and employed to detect
particular/specific anomalies in the system operation. Such anomalies can be caused
2

either by any benign internal fault or a malicious attack by users. These anomalies
serve as the inputs for the network administrator (security systems)1 as the alarms
about the security status of the network. When there is a user associated with such
reported anomalous activity, there comes an urgency to gather sufficient information
to identify the user’s original intention. If the reported anomaly was an innocent
fumble of a benign user or a step to build an attack by a malicious user is to be
investigated and determined. If sufficient information is gathered to conclude that the
operating of the user in the network to be an undue risk, the user is typically driven to a
honeypot, a computer configured to look like the main system to attackers with no
sensitive information in them, for further investigation. But before this is accomplished
the malicious user may succeed in his attack. If the user gets driven into honeypot,
there must be a framework for efficient interaction to gather sufficient information to
conclude the user to be benign or determine the nature of the intended attack, to
classify him. Based on the classification, either the user could be allowed back into the
system or subjected to corresponding punitive actions. In the other case, if the user
launches a successful attack, then there must be a protocol put in place to contain the
damage and deal with the attacker. These situations are typical to the security oriented
operations in the systems.
Many game theoretic ideas are being adopted and tested to address many types
security problems in the past decade. A comprehensive security system based on the
game theoretic ideas is yet to be developed. The step towards such a security system
1

We observe that, depending on the size and sophistication of the system, system administrators, network administrators and at times sophisticated security systems take the responsibility of maintaining
the security of the systems. So, we use administrator and security system to denote the defender against
the attacker.

3

based on the game theoretic approaches would be well facilitated by a generic security
game model in this dissertation. The game model, a 9-tuple, facilitates handling the
above premises comprehensively, facilitating stochastic games with imperfect
information and incomplete information, as and when are appropriate. The model
facilitates both a two-players game, modeling an attacker and the administrator
interacting and one with more number of players too. The games designed with both
zero sum and general sum could be instantiated with this model. The proposed
procedure to solve the game for its equilibrium, conveniently makes it flexible to be
used as the basis for developing the defense for many different kinds of attacks, with
bounded outcomes. We devise a procedure to represent the generic security game
model, adopting from the standard game theory literature. The model contains the
information of the states, the players and their action spaces, the strategy profiles,
payoffs and methods to represent the game’s progress. This model representing the
generic security gaming situations, is stored in a game model repository in the security
system. This facilitates deriving subsequent game models to address different types of
attacks, with their distinct features.
Along with these game models, a set of meta data of them, called
game-model-components are populated associated with each of the game model. The
set of anomalies reported by the sensors are used to infer / establish the possible
security situation going on. Then game model components are used to determine
which of the relevant game models addressing the current threat is the fittest. The game
model thus selected, determined by their solutions (equilibria), would determine the
strategies to be pursued, which in turn prescribe the action/actions/action-sequences.

4

These actions which are typical administrative actions would lead to results, with
bounded impacts, based on the model’s representatives of the attack-defense
scenarios. As the system matures, this would progressively lead to operation with
decreasing expert supervision and increasing automation.
Each security situation can be different with the same type of attack. Different game
models specifically designed to correspond to the typical cases of a single type of attack
can be effectively derived from this generic game model. Our work on the model’s
applicability establishes it with simulations. Such relevant game models are picked as
potential candidates to construct responses and compared by game assessment system
using their meta data called game-model-components, to pick the most fitting one.
Thus working with the relevant game model the defensive response is constructed.
Thus, the security system would respond to the attacks with defensive actions based on
the game, to ensure the security of the system, as well as possible.

1.1.1 Security of the Systems
The computational systems are conceived, designed, built and deployed to
perform a certain set of operations as per the requirements specified at the
requirements stage of the software development cycle. Any deviation in the behavior of
the system from the specifications, would be an anomaly that can lead to a security
breach. Functionally, the systems are defined by some parameters. These system
parameters are defined by some data structures. Security is defined over those defining
data structures, there by the information and the knowledge formulated around the
data they contain. Traditionally, the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability defined
over the data are used to define the security of the systems. In this work we follow the

5

same methodology to define the security of the systems. We define the system’s security
in terms of these three properties and then we aim to detect, stop and prevent any
attempt to violate these three properties.

1.1.2 System Modeling
The systems whose security we want to protect would be usually very complex in
their hardware and software configuration details. Its necessary to consider the
important aspects of the system and abstract the other details to be able to define the
security properties and thus track the security of the system. This leads us to develop
models of the system. There are many different approaches to model the system. In
fact, the requirements document at the beginning stage of the software development
cycle too is a model of the system. In this work we explore system modeling to enable
us to detect anomalies in the system behavior which would affect requirement
properties of interest, to secure the system. Consequently, we model the historical
behavior of the system, to identify the possible attacks going on from the detected
anomalies and relate it to the preferred set of defense measures.

1.2 Contribution
The game theory inspired security system has many components and was a
collaboration with many other researchers. This thesis is based on my individual
contribution to that project, which on the way led to identify, formulate and solve
many important problems. 2 The main contributions of the work presented in this
dissertation can be summarized as below.
1. Game Model and a Security Game.
2

Though the thesis is solely based on my individual work, (unless cited otherwise) and completely
written by myself, for the stylistic reason I have chosen to use the pronoun we throughout the text.

6

2. Algorithm to interact with suspicious user.

3. Modeling n-player co-operative security games.

4. Security system architecture. Design, analysis and implementation of many
components.

5. Security modeling of the cloud based systems.

1.2.1 Game Model and a Security Game
A game model was developed to instantiate the security games needed to be
executed in a security situation in a network. This facilitates, the incomplete, imperfect
information, general sum, stochastic and learning games as and when required. We
introduce such a game model. A generic security game representing the security based
interactions between the system/system administrator and the users, in different
scenarios is presented.

1.2.2 Framework to interact with suspicious user
The security game models the interaction in Honeypot where a suspected user is
being investigated. We present the framework to build the strategy for optimal result in
such an engagement.

1.2.3 Modeling n-player co-operative games
There can be a single attacker or a group of attackers co-operating to attack a
system. We provide the conditions to defining such a co-operation and response to a
group of co-operating attackers.

7

1.2.4 Security system architecture
We envision a full fledged security system based on the game theoretic ideas to
comprehensively address different security problems. In this work we present some of
the preliminary development of that system. We provide the design, analysis and the
implementation of many components of the system. By doing so we show some proof
of concept scenarios where the initial implementation of the security system
architecture provides effective security solution.

1.2.5 Security modeling of the cloud based systems
We investigate the cloud based systems, to formally model them to analyze them
for properties defining their security. We present a procedure to formulate the security
properties in these systems. This would lead to build a framework to identify when
these properties are violated, and eventually use the security system based on our
architecture to address the situation.
The results to be presented in this dissertation are based on my work in the papers
[53, 66, 70, 59, 2, 69, 60, 58, 63, 61, 62, 64]. This dissertation expands those results and
builds a coherent treatment of the subject.

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as a self contained exposition of the work related to
the game model, its design and analysis, a preliminary implementation of a
comprehensive security system architecture based on it and a security modeling of the
cloud based systems.
Chapter 2 presents the historical context of the field in which this work was done. It

8

presents the results of the surveys we conducted and how the problem was formulated.
Chapter 3 presents the problem formulation and the details of the game model. The
definition of the game model, the security game, the framework for interacting with the
suspicious user and the conditions for the co-operative games are presented with
numerical simulation results validating our analyses.
Chapter 4 presents the detailed architecture, organization and details of the security
system inspired by the game theoretic solutions. The design, analysis and preliminary
implementation details of the components of the security system along with
simulation as a proof of concept scenario are presented.
Chapter 5 presents the formal security modeling of the cloud based system and the
framework for use of the security system presented in the earlier chapter.
Chapter 6 presents the summary of the work presented here and discusses the open
problems and the planned future work.
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Chapter 2

Background
As the computational systems are taking on important roles in the society from
controlling the critical infrastructure to providing important services over Internet,
their security is becoming important. In this context it becomes important to cognize
what determines the security of these systems and how to ensure it. These touch upon
the fundamentals of system engineering, computation, algorithms and security aspects
of them. The classic problem of observability versus controllability trade-off plays an
important role in the development, deployment and operation of the security systems
built to secure any important system. Independently there have been many advances
in each of these areas. With the introduction of game theoretic ideas to address the
network security problems, the relevant advances in the game theory also provided the
necessary background for this work. More appropriately, the value of applying game
theory depends on the ability to compute the equilibrium points in the game by
identifying the strategies that lead to them. Thus efficient computation of the preferred
strategy to prescribe the action selection is the utility of game theory in these
applications. But the effectiveness of the game model to represent the system and its
behavior along with the computational complexities involved are major areas of active
10

research. The recent developments in both have set the stage for the work in this
dissertation. The development of the cloud based systems represents a new platform of
system, with its own distinct security needs. The modeling of these systems and their
security along with model checking have seen active developments recently which is
the background for the work in the Chapter 5. Here we introduce the basic terminology
and concepts which are used in the later chapters.

2.1 System
A system is a functional implementation of a transfer function of an input-output
pair. Here in this work we are concerned with the computational systems which are
based on a network of many computer systems. A computational system is an
instrumentation accomplishing two tasks: Store data structures and carryout a
processes to alter them. A process is usually accomplished with digital logic gates
implemented with semiconductor technologies. Here we consider the system to be a
network of many computational systems. A sensor network, a distributed Internet file
server, an online banking system, a control system of a medical setup, a control system
of a power grid, etc are the examples of what we refer to as a system in this dissertation.
These are the systems whose proper functioning is the matter of concern.

2.2 Security
We define the security of the system, a primary value of a system, as the conformity
of the intention in an action selection to the actual effect of the action execution.12 But
1

This way we can see the link between information(perception from the environment), cognition, intention, motivation, action selection, action execution, system’s state transition (real impact, future perception of environment, cognition of the post action environment (reality check), hopefully then the agent
remembers itself and its original motivation.)
2
Traditionally the similar concept of correctness is defined in software engineering as a piece of code
doing what the requirements want it to do.
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along with the direct components of system involved in the execution of the action,
depending upon the conditions of the overall system and the environment, there will
be consequences. The correspondence of these effects to the intentions and actions
give the measure of security. And since the systems are a combination of hardware and
software, the system defining parameters are represented by some data structures
spatially and (implementation of) algorithms temporally. The information in the data
structures related to the systems is an important factor in security, which is usually
communicated between sub-systems and systems. This is done using appropriate
signals to carry the information. Modulation is the process of altering the attributes of
the environment. Demodulation retrieves the information back from the signals. The
storage-retrieval is the modulation-demodulation done at the same place at different
points in time while transmission is done at almost same time but different points in
space.
The traditional definition of the security of the systems, a functional one, is in terms
of the properties related to the data, there by information and there by knowledge of
the systems parameters. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system
defined over the system’s defining parameters are used to define the security of the
system. Any violation of any of these three properties is appropriated to be a security
breach of the system. In the work presented in this dissertation, as a first step, we work
with this definition. 3 The values of the system’s defining parameters at an instant
define a state of the system. Temporally the variation of these values are attributed to
the changing of the states of the system in time. Such a sequence of states is called an
3

Developing the theory to formulate the definition we initially presented is planned as a future work.
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execution. A set of executions is called a property[29].
Confidentiality is generally defined as the information accessed by only those who
are authorized to access it. An account holder B in a bank, learning about the account
details, like month-end balance, deposit history, etc of another unrelated account
holder A, with out the permission of either A or the bank for official bank related
purposes, can be considered as an example of the breach of confidentiality of A.
Formally, it is defined as the unauthorized disclosure of information. In the case of a
system controlling critical infrastructure, this can lead to greater risks and harm.
Integrity is generally defined as the information remaining unchanged unless
altered by those who are authorized to change it. An account holder A in a bank, when
changes his residence address, will usually go to the bank personally or through the
bank’s website, changes the address associated with his account, where he shall receive
the mail related to the account like, monthly statement, etc. If another account holder
B in the bank, or any other person, is able access the online banking system and change
the address associated with the account of the user A, then this will amount to
breaching the integrity property associated with the account of A. When this happens,
the user B can misuse the information he has about A. Formally, it is defined as the
unauthorized altering of information.
Availability is generally defined as the information remaining accessible for the
authorized users when ever they want to access it. The information related the account
A, such as the current balance, must be accessible to A through the online banking
system when ever he wants to check it. If another user B accesses the online account of
A and changes the password, then when user A wants to enter the online banking
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system to know about his account details, will not be able to do so. This amounts to the
breach of availability of the online banking service to which he is entitled. 4 Formally, it
is defined as the unauthorized withholding of information.
The information related to the user A which is to be accessed only by him and other
banking authorities to facilitate the functioning of the banking, must not be accessed
by others. When others access that information, then the confidentiality property of the
account of the user A is breached. This formulation is related to the data associated
with the account of the user A. In this work we distinguish the Privacy and
Confidentiality. In general terms Privacy is do not ask, confidentiality is do not tell[18].
Confidentiality deals with content, Privacy deals with the Stake holder/ User of the
data. The other properties like authenticity, non-repudiation, safety, privacy and
related properties are desirable properties of a system. But these properties address
some general feature of the system, which specifies some rules for the behavior of the
components, users and agents in the system.
We are concerned about the properties and violation of properties of the system
during its execution. The runtime monitors in the system detect any violation of the
properties of the system[74]. We present a procedure to develop runtime monitors and
show its usefulness with two examples at Chapter 4.

2.3 Problems in Security
Violation of requirement properties of the system during the execution of any
processes in the system is a security breach. The security breach is caused by either or
both of the following:
4

We here observe that changing the password amounts to breach of integrity property too. But the
effect of it is to make the legitimate user unable to access his own account’s information.
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• a benign internal fault,

• a malicious attack by a stakeholder, usually a user.

There can be multiplicity or/and combination of the above factors in case of
complex breaches of security. When there is a security breach, the system is loosing on
one of its primary values.
As the complexity of the systems increases the co-ordination between different
components become a complex task. Whether centralized or not, the control and
co-ordination may have gaps leading to the first cause for the security breach. When
different components are controlled by different stakeholders this problem becomes
pronounced as in the case of Cloud Based Systems (CBS).
The recent successful malicious attacks on the computational system are observed
to have the following characteristics.

• advanced persistent threat [32]

• dynamic / evolving during the execution of attacks

• distributed

• stealth

• wiping out foot prints after successful attack completion

A complex attack may have more than one of the above characteristics. A single
attacker may launch attacks from different location with automated processes
controlled from one location. In many cases a group of attackers collaborate to launch
an attack. In each of these cases the attacks and the appropriate responses become
15

more involved. As the systems start becoming more important and with high value
assets, it becomes imperative to systematize the security mechanism to address
potential security breaches.

2.4 Security System
A security system is an independent system or a subsystem, being a component of
the main system, which mainly prevents, deters, repairs, recovers and learns from
security breaches, by doing

• detection of or attempts to make security breaches,

• identification of the true nature and intention of the attempt,

• evaluating the preferred response strategies,

• executing the defensive actions,

• acquiring the knowledge from the security situation occurred,

• improving the system configuration and defense safer future operation.

The activities indicated above form the general case. Some security systems may
accomplish a variant or a subset of it to serve the purpose.
As the security breaches are evolving the security systems need to evolve to be
effective. In this work we present a general architecture of security systems at Chapter 4
which is aimed to address the security breaches as in 2.3.
To effectively address the attacks as in 2.3, is to identify them at the earliest
opportunity and engage with the attacker / attackers / attack processes to get enough
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information to respond appropriately. We recognize that Game Theory offers a useful
framework to model such interactions.

2.5 Game Theory
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that deal with the interaction between
decision makers [46]. It is modeling of the quantitative parameters involved during the
interaction. The main assumption underlying this theory is, the players use the
knowledge or expectation about their surroundings including the environment and
other players, make rational choices to pursue their goals based on their motivation.
The most basic entity in a game is the ‘player’.We consider the player as a decision
making entity or ’action selecting’ entity. The action selection is about choosing an
action among many possible alternatives. The actions are selected under constraints
and the consideration of the reward/cost associated with it and the reactions from the
other players involved in the next steps. The players are considered rational which
means that they use the information available to them to make the best decision to
improve their expected rewards. The model which specifies such an mechanism is
called a Game Model.
A game is an evaluation of the game model with all the elements of the tuple being
populated with values, starting at the initial state with action selection by and reward
attribution to players at each successively occurring state. Thus, the players making
some choices for their action and the current state of the game changes from the initial
state in steps across possibly many states to reach a final state in case finite horizon
games or not in the case of infinite horizon games. The players usually stop considering
the consequences of further state transitions in the game after a threshold, based on
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some convenient criteria, while dealing with infinite horizon games. One criterion is to
discount the rewards by a factor for each future state transition away from the present
instant. An underlying assumption that the players are rational is many times
challenged by those who study human behaviors both at individual and collective
levels. The idea of bounded rationality introduced to accommodate some of the
conflicting claims for a rational behavior from the players in pursuing their motivation.
A general introduction to the game theory is available in the textbook [46] by Osborne
and Rubinstein. In the work presented here we consider the rational behavior and
other variants in player’s behavior are planned for future work.

2.5.1 Game Model
There are many ways to define game models. A two player game model [36] for
stochastic games was represented as a tuple (S, A 1 , A 2 ,Q, R 1 , R 2 , β) whose elements are
defined below.
• S =⇒ Number of States.
• A 1 =⇒ Action set of first player, the set of all actions the player 1 can take at any
or all of the states the game can be.
• A 2 =⇒ Action set of second player, the set of all actions the player 2 can take at
any or all of the states the game can be.
• Q =⇒ The transition function, it maps a set on states as next states with
probabilities given the current state and the action selections by the players.
• R 1 =⇒ The reward function of first player.
• R 2 =⇒ The reward function of second player.
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• β =⇒ The discount factor, the factor (0 < β < 1) with which the players consider
the rewards from the transitions in future steps.

In a model, for a player, during games, a plan of action at each state is called a Strategy.
The strategy prescribes at each state and (considered / possible / expected) response by
all the other players, only one action then it is a Pure Strategy. Otherwise a prescription
of a set of actions with a probability distribution associated with actions, is called a
Mixed Strategy. An extension of this model to accommodate imperfect information was
done at [67]. We present a simpler model with improvements at Chapter 3. In a game,
from at at least one state, if the game can transit to more than one state with some
probability, with the same action selection by the players, then the game is called a
stochastic game.
In a game if all the players know the strategies and rewards function of all the
players at each state, then it is called an complete information game, if not an
incomplete information game. A game, where all players know all the actions by all
players from the beginning, that is, effectively, the exact state of the game at every
instance of the game, is called a perfect information game if not imperfect information
game. Since the amount of information each player has bears upon his action
selection, the imperfect and incomplete games make his decision more involved filled
with more uncertainty.
During the interaction between the users and the administrators during a security
situation, the amount of information each has varies from event to event. Then game
models have to facilitate games with perfect-complete, perfect-incomplete,
perfect-incomplete and imperfect-incomplete information games depending on
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information with the players in the situation. We surveyed the efforts to model such
games for cyber security situations [67]. A simulation of security game with 5 strategic
options of administrator and the adversary is at [45].
During the course of an incomplete information game, the players have to learn
about the nature and intention of the other players. The extra information got at each
step is used to update the belief about other players. This is modeled by Bayesian
Games [21]. Since nature of the suspicious users has to be investigated through careful
interaction, the Bayesian games are useful. [67] discusses some of the initial attempts
in using Bayesian games. We present results for accommodating such games with the
model presented in Chapter 3.

2.5.2 Equilibria and Computational Complexity
The games are evaluation of the game models with values for each of the
component of tuple. In a game, the players control only the action selection at each
state. With that as the input, each player wants to maximize the expected rewards for
him. The precise version of this intent is given by the min-max theorem [43]. A solution
concept is one such plan for action for players such that the corresponding expected
rewards satisfy in some form, the intent of the payers. When the intent is translated
into objectives, the evaluation of the game made for maximizing the gains (positive of
upper bounds of rewards) and minimizing the maximum loss (negative or lower bound
of rewards), directs the player to take actions which can results in the highest expected
rewards. The games are classified depending on the reward structures.

1. If the sum of rewards of all the players is zero at each state transition of the game,
then such a game is called a Zero Sum Game.
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2. If the sum of rewards of all the players is a Constant Value at each state transition,
the game is a Constant Sum Game.

3. If the sum of rewards of all the players is a variable value at each state transition,
the game is a Variable Sum Game.

The 2,3 are jointly referred to as Non-Zero Sum or General Sum Game.
The sequences (tuple) of strategies of all the players is called solution concepts of
the game, if they ensure some condition for preferred rewards for each player. The
solution concept which ensures that no player can improve his expected rewards, by
unilaterally changing his strategy while others don’t, is called a Nash Equilibrium. Its
existence for all mixed strategy games is proved at [41]. There are many other useful
types of equilibriua like Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Sub-Game-Perfect Equilibrium
etc. In the problems of mechanism design as the present one, the design must ensure
required optimality expecting each stakeholder to act selfishly5 . This is an attempt to
reduce the price of anarchy [52, 51].
With this premise, though the equilibria look very lucrative, computing them is
challenging. A dynamic altering of the properties of a computing platform based on the
game-theory to counter the attacks is studied with simulations at [3]. A zero-sum game
model is presented at [28]. A game theoretic framework with classification of the
attackers based on the skill and motivation, with solution based on solving the Markov
chain is at [39]. A game theoretic attempt to secure the infrastructure resources is at
[23]. Computation of 2-Player Nash Equilibrium is shown at [7] to be complete in the
5

In case of the security games between the administrator / security system and a suspicious user, the
required optimality is the maximization of the administrator reward which in turn would be representing
the security of the target system.
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class PPAD introduced at [48]. An algorithm for general-sum stochastic game in two
scenarios is at [49].
We present in Chapter 3 a game model, a security game and introduce a solution
concept of ²−neighborhood optimal strategy profile. Based on this game model a
security architecture is proposed at 4. Since most of the present computational
processes is being operated on Cloud Computing Infrastructure we investigate the
Cloud Based Systems to establish a formal structure to effectively deploy our security
system architecture.

2.6 Cloud Based Systems
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines [38]: Cloud
computing as a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction. In recent times, the increased
popularity of the cloud computing technology is due to the convenience and
affordability among other reasons. But Security and privacy are the important concerns
associated with it. The main reasons for these concerns are not only the disparate
components enabling the cloud technology but also the different stakeholders involved
in it. This is due to the very nature of its technology.
The end users who use the services on the cloud eventually build a complex system
involving their own local systems including portable and mobile devices, local area
networks in their offices/homes, the Internet service which enables them to connect to
the systems of one or more cloud service providers and the third party software and
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web services running remotely to enable their whole operation. These different
components make up the cloud based system (CBS) used by the end users. Thus, each
stake holder has access to some parts of this cloud based system and has a set of
privileges allowing some actions and corresponding responsibilities in maintaining the
security of the overall system. Though there are many stakeholders we here focus on
the role of the consumer who buys the cloud based services and builds his own CBS. A
consumer constructs a computational space, with his cloud based system and operates
over it. This space can be viewed as a graph with nodes having some data and tasks
associated with them. This computational space can be modeled to verify if the space
conforms to the needed security constraints both by design and while operation by
keeping track of processes. There are attempts to model the CBSs in [40] & [15].
Building on these works, we present at Chapter 5 the framework for modeling the CBSs
to analyze for the properties to specify security breaches and the solutions.
Using this framework, we can specify the requirement property we want, to identify
the attempt for security breaches as violation of a monitorable property of this model.
Thus we show that as [15] employed with DDOS, the attempts for security breach can
not only be analyzed using PVESTA , we can eventually build runtime monitors[74], by
devising the suitable instrumentation over the parameters which can be accessed.
Unlike in [66], where the instrumentation checks exact states and thus needing access
to the source code, by only keeping track of the important accessible parameters in the
processes, as per their statistical behavior sampled randomly, a more practical
instrumentation can be sufficient to build monitors to achieve the statistical
monitoring. Similarly we present that the security solutions also can be modeled as
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constraints operating to preserve the security described as requirement properties.
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Chapter 3

Game Model
There is a growing attempt in the past decade to apply game theoretic approaches
to the field of network security. In a network, when a user’s anomalous behavior is
observed by the administrator, it may be impossible to immediately decide if the user is
an attacker or not. Moreover, even if the user has malicious intentions, such initial
observation may not be sufficient to fully understand the motivations of the attacker.
In such cases, when there is not enough information to classify a user exhibiting
anomalous behavior, game theory offers a framework for interaction. Roy et al. [53]
gives a survey of the works to model the interaction between a user and a network
administrator and it provides a classification of these works based on the game models
used. Lyewin et al. [36] modeled the interaction between an attacker and the
administrator as a stochastic game with 14 states considering 3 types of attacks. Their
game assumed perfect information. Shiva et al. [67] presented a two state, imperfect
information, zero sum, stochastic game with numerical simulation showing the
advantage of considering the imperfect information. The main motivation for
considering the imperfection in the information was the errors in the player’s sensors.
The error in the sensor makes the player believe that he may be in the states other than
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the state he really is. Here we make two extensions to this work. The simulation
method used to study and explore the value of the game and the rewards for the
strategies are an extension of Nochenson et al. [45] who present a simulation based
game with only 5 strategic options.
Our model has the same structure, with simpler representation, as the one in Shiva
et al. [67] with one extension. When there are more than two states in the game, this
error in sensor could make him mistakenly believe he is in any of the other states than
the one he really is in. The error in perceiving the state gets distributed over the other
states depending on the error in reading of the sensor needed to misread the state as
the current state. Based on this extension in the game model, a game with five states is
designed. The error in the perception of current state gets distributed over the four
states other than the real state. Thus, the probability of the player 1 being deluded to be
in any of the other states is proportional to the distance between the sensor readings of
state defining variables of the other states from that of the current real state.
The second extension is in the game. Since the set of actions available at each state
are distinct in the game considered here the extended action sets will be different from
the original action sets. For the administrator the sensor error is the cause of perceiving
the current state as an information set instead of a single state. The user, who is
assumed in this work to have an error free sensor, also faces deception while game
enters the Trap state. Then administrator’s ploy in the honey pot makes the user unsure
of his current state and causes extension of his perceived action set. This increase in the
size of the perceived action set at honey pot for the user, making his/her choosing the
1

The player is the administrator, as the sensor of the user is considered to be error free. We are considering here the worst case scenario for the administrator. Our work can be extended to the case with the
user having erroneous sensors also.
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action less obvious due to increased apparent choices. Following these interactions, the
administrator will be able to determine the motive of the user under suspicion. This
whole interaction based on the administrator’s ploy is abstracted into one single state.
We analyze the game for its solution discussing the preferred strategies. A
numerical simulation implemented in programming language C of the game validating
the analysis is presented. In evaluating the simulation, we discern that the strategy has
to precipitate into game theoretic actions, which in turn into computer/ network
administration actions. We present a gradation of aggression the players can assert and
study game’s dynamics.

3.1 Goals
The game model developed in this work is generic and not tied to any specific type
of attack-defense security scenario. The game models to be developed for specific type
of security scenarios will be derived using this generic game model, without the need to
reinvent the design starting from the solution concepts of their security games with
relevant equilibrium. Some of the specific game models may not use all the design
features in this game model, but only a subset of it, based on what is relevant to that
particular type of attack-defense scenario. The main goals of the work are summarized
below:

1. To identify typical scenarios in generic security situation

2. To identify the features of the game model to capture the scenarios

3. To find the bounds and formal guarantees of that model, in providing solutions to
the games that it instantiates
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4. To validate the results of analysis with simulations, to get a quantified idea of
games’ solutions

5. To build the game model repository with typical game models and metadata of
the models (game model components) derived from the generic game model

6. To establish functional connections to the game model repository with the game
selection system and attack identification system

Thus the game model presented here is the first step eventually leading to the preferred
computer / network administration action at each step while addressing an attack as
shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Generic Game Model’s Utility

3.2 Approach
Identifying the generic structure of the security incidentss gives the functional
framework for the security system. With in that framework, the games instantiated with
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game models have to prescribe the appropriate response to get optimal result. A
general overview of the security situation is shown by Fig 3.2. The approach of our work
towards the goals has the following steps:

Figure 3.2: Internal Flow Diagram

1. The first step towards designing the network security game model is to be able to
identify the generic phases in a security situation, that occur in the typical
attack-defense scenarios.
2. The second step is to recognize the suitable game theoretic model to model these
scenarios. To find the theoretical bounds and formal guarantees such a model
provides, in its solutions to the games that it facilitates.
3. The third step is to validate the theoretical results with simulation, to get a
quantified idea of the games’ solutions.
4. The fourth step is to build the game model repository system with functional
connection to the Game Selection System.

3.3 Problem Statement
With the goals as in section 3.1, we formulate the problems as below:
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1. To design a game model, which facilitates games with,

(a) stochastic transition function,
(b) imperfect information,
(c) incomplete information,
(d) general sum rewards with mixed strategies by players,
(e) dynamic games with dynamic transition function2 .

2. To design a generic network security game which accommodates

(a) the behavior of a users with benign, malicious and changing motivations
(b) the behavior of the administrator observing anomalous users behavior and
starting the game,
(c) the competitive behavior / interaction of users and the administrator
pursuing conflicting objectives,
(d) the interaction when the user successfully attacks,
(e) the interaction when the administrator successfully drives the user to
honeypot,
(f ) the interaction with the prescription of preferred strategies of
optimal/preferred outcomes with bounded errors.

3. To show how the incomplete information games by administrator in the
honeypot are facilitated,
2

We show our model can be easily adopted and extended for the dynamic transition function during
the course of a game, as we plan it as our future work to execute such games with simulation and real life
experiments to study their dynamics.
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4. To show how the co-operative games amongst the users against the administrator
are handled,

5. a security architecture with a game model repository using game models based
on the one presented here 3 ,

6. a formal analysis of the cloud based systems to design a procedure to use the
presented security architecture 4 .

3.4 Premise
A survey of application of game theory for network security based on the targets in
a network is at [37]. A survey of different network related attribution to the game
theoretic actions with equilibrium calculation is at [35]. A simulation of security game
with 5 strategic options of administrator and the adversary is at [45]. A dynamic altering
of the properties of a computing platform based on the game-theory to counter the
attacks is studied with simulations at [3]. A zero-sum game model is presented at [28].
A game theoretic framework with classification of the attackers based on the skill and
motivation, with solution based on solving the Markov chain is at [39]. A game
theoretic attempt to secure the infrastructure resources is at [23]. Computation of
2-Player Nash Equilibrium is shown at [7] to be complete in the class PPAD introduced
at [48]. An algorithm for general-sum stochastic game in two scenarios is at [49].
In a network, when a user’s anomalous behavior is observed by the administrator, it
may not be possible to immediately decide if the user is an attacker or not. More over,
even if the user has malicious intentions, such initial observation may not be sufficient
3
4

Presented in Chapter 4.
Presented in Chapter 5.
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to fully understand the motivations of the attacker. In such cases, when there is not
enough information to classify a user exhibiting anomalous behavior, game theory
offers a framework for interaction. [53] gives a survey of the works to model the
interaction between a user and a network administrator and it provides a classification
of these works based on the game models used. [36] modeled the interaction between
an attacker and the administrator as a stochastic game with 14 states considering 3
types of attacks. Their game assumed perfect information. [67] presented a two state,
imperfect information, zero sum, stochastic game with numerical simulation showing
the advantage of considering the imperfect information. The main motivation for
considering the imperfection in the information was the errors in the player’s sensors.
The error in the sensor makes the player believe that he may be in the states other than
the state he really is. Here we make two extensions to this work. The simulation
method used to study and explore the value of the game and the rewards for the
strategies are an extension of [45] which has only 5 strategic options.
Our model has the same structure with one extension. When there are more than
two states in the game, this error in sensor could make him mistakenly believe he is in
any of the other states than the one he really is in. The error in perceiving the state gets
distributed over the other states depending on the sensor reading’s error needed to
misread the state as the current state. Based on this extension in the game model, a
game with five states is designed. The error in the perception of current state gets
distributed over the four states other than the real state. Thus, the probability of the
player 5 being deluded to be in any of the other states is proportional to the distance
5

administrator, as the sensor of the user is considered to be error free We are considering here the worst
case scenario for the administrator. Our work can be extended to the case with user too having erroneous
sensors.
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between the sensor readings of state defining variables of the other states from that of
the current real state.
The second extension is in the game. Since the set of actions available at each state
are distinct in the game considered here the extended action sets will be different from
the original action sets. For the administrator the sensor error is the cause of perceiving
the current state as an information set instead of a single state. The user, who is
assumed in this work to have an error free sensor, also faces deception while game
enters the Trap state. Then administrator’s ploy in the honey pot makes the user unsure
of his current state and causes extension of his perceived action set. This increase in
the size of the perceived action set at honey pot for the user, making his/her choosing
the action less obvious due to increased apparent choices. Following these interactions,
administrator will be able to determine the motive of the user under suspicion. This
whole interaction based on the administrator ploy is abstracted into one single state.
We analyze the game for its solution discussing the preferred strategies. A numerical
simulation implemented in C of the game validating the analysis is presented. In
evaluating the simulation, we discern that the strategy has to precipitate into game
theoretic actions, which in turn into computer/ network administrator actions. We
present a gradation of aggression the players can assert and study the game’s dynamics.
The main motivation for this work is to devise a game model and a game generic
enough to incorporate real security games, needed to build a security system. Chapter
4 presents the architecture to construct a security system based on the game theory
approach. The generic game model and the game here are useful to derive different
game models and instantiate games, appropriate for different security situations. The
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major features of this work are summarized as below:

1. We extend the previously proposed model by devising a method for modeling the
distribution of sensor error over multiple states.

2. We devise a game which is representative of the security related interactions. The
game has 5 states, each having a distinct action set, resulting in distinct
perceived/extended action set corresponding to each distinct information set of
states.

3. We present the expression for the generalized Imperfect Information Factor at
Appendix A.1.

4. We present the numerical simulations studying the dynamics of such a game
when played with malicious users of different natures, and picking the preferred
strategy profile.

3.5 Game Model
The model considers that a player 6 k observes the game’s true state using an
imperfect sensor/ a set of imperfect sensors. That means, player k can view the present
state ξ j to be any state in the information set I ξk = {ξ j 1 , ξ j 2 , . . . , ξ j p } with ξ j being an
j

element of I ξk . The perceived action set at this state may be expanded, i.e., player may
j

decide to take an action which is allowed at ξ j i 6= ξ j where ξ j i belongs to I ξk . When the
j

true state is ξ j , let the player k’s extended action set B ξk =
j

S

ξ j ∈I ξk

j

A kξ where A kξ denotes
j

j

the allowed action set of player k at state is ξ j .If the player k takes an action αk ∈ B ξ j ,
when the true state is ξ j but αk is not in A kj , then in terms of the influence on state
6

k=0, 1, . . . , K for one administrator and users respectively.
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transition probabilities, αk is considered equivalent to player k taking no action at state
ξ j . However, its influence on player k’s payoff αk may not be equivalent to player k
taking no action at state ξ j depending upon the cost of the attempted execution of αk .
Formally, the model is represented by a tuple, (S, E 1 , E 2 , A 1 , A 2 ,Q, R 1 , R 2 , β) whose
elements are defined below.
• S = {ξ1 , ξ2 , . . . , ξN } is the set of states.
• E k = {E ξk , E ξk , . . . , E ξk }, k=1,2 where the j t h , 0 < j < N , set E ξ j with
1

N

2

E ξk = {p kj | 1 ≤ i ≤ m j ,

Pm j

i =1

i

j

p kj = 1, p kj > 0. }, represents the error probabilities of
i

i

k t h player’s sensor at the true state ξ j over the corresponding information set, I ξk .
j

I k = {I ξk , I ξk , ..., I ξk }, k =1,2 where the I ξk represents the information set of player k
1

N

2

j

when the true state is ξ j , i.e., I ξk = {ξ j 1 , ξ j 2 , . . . , ξ j i , . . . , ξ j m j } where
j

m j =| I ξk |, ξ j i ∈ S, with m j ≤ N being an integer indicating the number of states
j

that have a possibility of being considered the current state at state ξ j with the
condition that ξ j ∈ I ξ j .
• A k = {A kξ , A kξ , . . . , A kξ }, k = 1, 2 is the action set of player k,
1

N

2

where A kξ = {αkj , αkj , . . . , αkj
1

j

1

Mk

} is the action set of player k at state ξ j .

Let B k = {B ξk , B ξk , . . . , B ξk }, k=1,2, where B ξk represents the action set of player k at
1

n

2

I ξk . That means B ξk =
j

j

j

S

ξ j ∈I ξk

j

A kξ . By introducing different action sets at each
j

state we may get distinct B ξk at for each distinct I ξk . Let Tξk = | B ξk |.
j

j

j

j

• The state transition probabilities are represented by function
Q : S × B 1 × B 2 × S → [0 1] which maps a pair of states and a pair of actions to a
real number between 0 and 1. The model assumes that for any state ξkj if the
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player k takes an action αkj ∈ B ξk , that does not belong to A kξ , then
j

j

Q(ξ j 1 , αki , αli , ξ j 2 ) = Q(ξ j 1 , Normal_operation, αli , ξ j 2 ) where l represents the
1

2

2

other player.
• The reward7 of the player k is determined by the function R k : S × B 1 × B 2 → R
which maps a state and a pair of actions to a real number.
• β, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor for discounting the future rewards in this
infinite horizon game.

3.5.1 The error distribution
As E k represents the set of error probabilities of the player k, let us consider the set
of error probabilities E ξk with the current state being ξ j . Let the error of the sensor for
j

player k at the state ξ j is γkj , 0 ≤ γkj < 1. The error γkj is always less than 1 because the
real state ξ j is always taken as an element of the information set I ξ j at ξ j . Then at the
current state ξ j , let the probabilities with which administrator perceives the current
state to be ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 and ξ4 be p kj , p kj , p kj , and p kj respectively. Then the error at state
1

2

3

4

P
ξ j isγkj = ( iN=1 p kj ) − p kj = 1 − p kj . For 1 ≤ i , j ≤ N , let ωkj be the set of sensor inputs to
i

j

j

i

the player k indicating the current state to be ξi , while the real current state is ξ j . In
practice the sensor can be a device or a collection of devices which collects values of
some parameters of the system. All such parameters can be considered to form an
orthogonal basis of the vector space, where some closed volume is taken to be
associated with each state. All of those points in that closed region get mapped to one
state. All of them have the values of the parameters which lead the player to perceive
7

The expected quantified value of the outcome is called reward.
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the current state to be the particular state.8 Let the current real state be ξ j , where
1 ≤ j ≤ N . At this state the sensor inputs at two different instances be, say ωkj and ωkj ,
i

h

where 1 ≤ i , h ≤ N due to erroneous sensors. This leads to the perception of the current
state to be ξi and ξh respectively. Depending on the nature of the system, consider
some representative statistical measure of central tendencies9 of ωkj and ωkj . Let E d kj
i

h

ih

to be the Euclidean distance between those measures.In this work, larger errors are
assumed to be less probable than the smaller errors in sensor operations,that is,
E d kj > E d kj ⇒ p kj > p kj . In the following game with 5-states, the sensor error is
ji

i

jh

h

distributed over the three states other than the real current state. This means for
example, if the sensor error at ξ1 is 0.3, then the probability with which the
administrator perceives the current state to be not ξ1 is 0.3. This could result in
perceiving the current state to be ξ2 , ξ3 and ξ4 states respectively with probabilities of
0.15, 0.1 and 0.05. From the sensor relation, we have the sensor error at state
ξ j |i 6= j , γkj =

PN

k
i =1 p j i

related to the probabilities of virtual states.

The sensor outputs values of parameters which define states. Particular range of
values of particular set of parameters will correspond to a state. In fact the general way
to define it, is a set of values, covering the range, for each of the parameters to
correspond to a state. And if there are some parameters whose values do not affect in
deciding a particular state then then range can accommodate any value.
• values10 corresponding to a set of parameters 11
8

It is true that some of the parameters may yield discontinuous intervals of values associated with a
single state. This makes a set of disconnected regions correspond to a single state. In such cases we have
to device more involved mechanisms, which is apt for future enquiries.
9
Like Mean, Mode, Median.
10
range of values, represented by a MCT
11
(eg. download bandwidth used, upload bandwidth used, number of ftp requests by a user, . . .)
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• a vector space with these parameters constituting the basis 12

Thus we can see the state definition as follows.

• S → S − O, where
– S − O = {S − O 0 , S − O 1 , S − O 2 , . . . S − O N },
– S − O i = {s − o i 0 , s − o i 1 , s − o i 2 , . . . , s − o i F i }
– s − o i j = (s − o i j (0), s − o i j (1), s − o i j (2), . . . , s − o i j (g )) =⇒ j t h g − dimensional
sequence corresponding to i t h state, ξi .
– s − o i j (l ) = a MCT, representative value of the expected range of values for
the l t h parameter in the j t h behavior ∈ ξi .l ∈ N, 0 ≤ l ≤ g
– g = number of parameters observed by sensors
– 0 ≤ j ≤ F i , where F i + 1 disjoint ranges correspond to state ξi
When there is an anomaly detected, in terms of sensor values, which do not exactly
fit into any particular state and there is uncertainty about to which state the current
values belong to, imperfect information must be considered.

• Current observed Values of parameters as anomaly
CV = (c v 0 , c v 1 , c v 2 , . . . , c v g ) =⇒ current values of g parameters
• consider the minimum of Euclidean distances with elements in each
state(∆0 f 0 , ∆1 f 1 , ∆2 f 2 , . . . , ∆N f N ). where f i =⇒ the f i t h element, 0 ≤ f i ≤ F i has
the minimum of distances between CV and s − o i f i element in the i t h state.
12

(orthogonal/orthonormal) depending on the parameters’ co-relation
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•
∆i f i

v
u P j =g
u
t j =0 c v j − (s − o i j )
=
g
mi n

(3.1)

The error in perception of states is given by
P j =N
j =0

p ji =

∆ j f j − ∆i f i

P j =N
j =0

∆jf j

(3.2)

And the error distribution is given by
• Then the error at state ξ j is

γkj = (

N
X
i =1

p kji ) − p kjj = 1 − p kjj

.

• larger errors are assumed to be less probable than smaller errors
An simple illustration to show its application can be as below.
Example:
Low_Privilege State
• 8AM-6PM = {Download≤2Mbps, Upload≤150kbps }
This behavior is high-privilege, when manager works at his computer.
High_Privilege State
• 8AM-6PM = {Download≤2Mbps, Upload≤150kbps }
This behavior is high-privilege, when manager works at his computer.
Sensor Readings At 3:30PM there is 1.7Mbps download and 150 kbps upload.
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(3.3)

•

(0.7+0.3)−0.7
(0.7+0.3)

= 0.3 Probability in Low_Privilege State. Mean Download: 1 Mbps

•

(0.7+0.3)−0.3
(0.7+0.3)

= 0.7 Probability in High_Privilege State. Mean Download: 2 Mbps

3.5.2 Reward and Transition Functions
In a given state of the game, the action selected by the players decide their rewards
and not the resulting state transition that happens depending on such a selection. The
rewards are affected by the

• The cost of attempting/executing an action. Let the unit vector representing this
be a 1 .
• The desirability of the possible state change brought by the selection of an action.
Let the unit vector representing this be a 2 .
• The amount of information being divulged to the other players regarding the
intention made explicit by the selection of an action. Let the unit vector
representing this be a 3 .
Depending upon the system these aspects may be mutually affecting each other or
independent of each other. The reward is located in the vector space thus constructed
with these unit vectors as basis. With system having, each of these aspects a 1 , a 2 and a 3
with i , j ∈ {1, 2, 3} & i 6= j , fully affecting the other,( co-linear), a i · a j = 1 , being mutually
independent(orthogonal), a i · a j = 0 and when partially affect each other will have
0 < a i · a j < 1. An illustration is at AppendixA.2.
The transition depends on the actions selected by the players in the current state
and the stochasticity involved. Stochasticity is not arbitrary nor have to do with the

40

instability of the system per se, but provides for the possibility of the state transition
propelled by the actions of the players with conflicting interests.

3.5.3 Equilibrium
Given the information set associated with each state j , 0 ≤ j ≤ 4 the corresponding
mixed strategy is given as πk (ξ j ) = [πk (ξi , αki ), πk (ξi , αki ), . . . , πk (ξi , αki )], where ξi ∈ I ξk ,
1

2

l

j

l =| A kξ | & αki ∈ B ξk . Thus, | πk (ξ j ) |= Tξk . We are considering general-sum games. When
i

j

j

the game starts, say at ξ j , with the input of state ξ j and each player’s selected action
(α0j , α1j , α2j , . . . , αKj ), we calculate the reward at state ξ j of each player, r jk , 0 ≤ k < K as per
the reward function R k . The net reward incurred by player k is
νk(π0 ,π1 ,π2 ,...,πK ) =

P− lnβ y
j =0

β j q j νk(π0 ,π1 ,π2 ,...,πK ) (ξ j ), where q j is the probability of reaching

the state ξ j |ξ j ∈ S during the game’s execution at j t h step. q j =

Qi = j

i =0

q i , q 0 = 1 as game

does start at ξ j state with j = 0, q j is the probability of game reaching ξ j from ξ j −1 . y is
the effective discounting factor deciding the threshold at horizon, due to insignificance
of the effective value addition of further rewards. Since the game is an imperfect
information game, B ξ0 gives the perceived action set. Here if the states ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 are
1

perceived to be the current state with a probability say, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.6 respectively, we
get the probabilities associated with actions of each state multiplied by these
corresponding probabilities. With this extended action set, the selection is done, by
each players, their rewards are calculated for this step.
We know that the actions belonging to ξ2 & ξ3 cannot be executed and its selection
is equated to selecting the normal operation of ξ1 , for the effect on state transition.Now
based on these probabilities the effective action selection is evaluated for the player.
Thus the Nash equilibrium would be the strategy profile (π0∗ , π1∗ , π2∗ , . . . , πK )
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|c 0 &c 1 & . . . &c k & . . . &c K where c k =⇒ νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πki ,...,πK
∗)

≤ νk

(π0∗ π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πk∗ ,...,πK
∗)

,

∀i , ∀c k |0 ≤ k ≤ K .

3.6 The Game
In this section we present the game with five states based on the model in section
3.5, to address the security situations. In general the user presence in a network system
can be classified as one with low and high privileges. The exact privileges could be
different depending on the networks and situations, but this distinction provides
distinct premises for the access, possible actions and responsibilities of the user. Thus
the activities, both malicious and benign, security related or not, could be respectively
categorized and represented by formulating two different states. When a malicious
user successfully attacks and a suspicious user gets trapped in a honeypot by the
administrator for investigation, the resulting two situations are formulated as two other
states. When the user logs out of the system he is considered to be out there in the
Internet in another state. Since the security oriented activity happens only after the
user is at least in the low privilege state, to start with, the game as in 3.8 explicitly begins
at the Low_Privilege_State in the Fig 3.3. Thus these 5 states provide a relevant
representation of general conditions of user activity and hence the user-administrator
interaction.
S={ Internet_State (ξ0 ),Low_Privilege_State (ξ1 ), High_Privilege_State(ξ2 ),
Attack_State(ξ3 ), Trap_State(ξ4 )}
ξ0 = Internet_State: In this state, the user is out there in the world connected to
Internet. He has to go through authentication as in Sign_In successfully to get in to the
system. For this, the user must take the Sign-In-Request action and the administrator
must grant/take-the-action Sign_In to the user. The normal operation in this state by
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Figure 3.3: The Game: States & Transition
the user means that he is not doing a legitimate request for Sign_In, and just like
millions on net, is just out there on some IP-address. The normal operation in this state
by the administrator means that he is not taking-in/Signing-in this user by granting the
permission to be in the system. The cracking efforts to break in to the system by a user
is also captured by the normal operation of the user. The blocking, refusal to letting in
or system just being unavailable is also captured by the administrator’s normal
operation.This is to emphasize the main focus to be the interaction of a user while he is
already in the system.The game reaches this state

• when the administrator successfully signs out a user from any of the other 4
states, in response to user’s any choice of action including a Sign_Out_Request at
that state.

– when the user having completed his legitimate jobs in the system goes away.
– when the malicious user having completed his malicious tasks escapes out
of the system out in to the Internet.

• when a person connected to the Internet tries to sign in to the system with a
Sign_In_Request but the administrator refuses to let in.
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• when a person connected to the Internet tries to sign in to the system with a
Sign_In_Request and the administrator allows to let in but the operation fails
(due to bad connection, system problem, etc captured by the stochasticity) and
the user remains outside the system on Internet.

Thus the action set of both the administrator & the user is as below.
A 0ξ ={Normal_Operation_IS_U (α000 ), Sign-In_IS (α001 )} A 1ξ ={Normal_Operation_IS_A
0

0

(α100 ), Sign-In_Request_IS (α101 )}
ξ1 = Low_Privilege_State: In this state the user is in the system passing through the
initial authentication. This is the state when the administrator can take notice of the
user’s activity. Any anomaly in the user behavior will start attracting administrator’s
attention/concern. The game can reach this state,

• when the user is already in the system after logging in going through the initial
authentication successfully. The administrator can observe the user behavior,
though he is not particularly concerned, to begin with.
• when the transition from ξ1 to ξ2 does not succeed, either due to the given the
transition probability (system’s stochasticity), or the administrator may decide
not to promote the user to ξ2 .
• when the user in ξ2 acts to return to low privilege, the administrator demotes and
the transition succeeds.

• when the administrator decides that a user does not have any malicious
intention at ξ4 & lets him back into the system.
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• when the user who successfully attacked the system at ξ3 , returns to legitimate &
low key behavior with in the system either to continue to be so or to elope later.
This happens when the user takes the action Return_LPS and the administrator
takes the action Normal_Operation_AS_A(α211 ) the transition succeeds as per the
occurrence ratio.
A 0ξ =
1

{Normal_Operation_LPS_A (α010 ), Sign-Out_LPS(α011 ), Promote (α012 ),
Defend_LPS(α013 ), Trap_LPS(α014 )}
A 1ξ =
1

{Normal_Operation_LPS_U (α110 ), Sign-out_Request_LPS (α111 ), Privilege_Request
(α112 ), Attack_LPS(α113 ), Resist_LPS(α114 )}13
ξ2 = High_Privilege_State: In this state the user has gained more privileges than in
the ξ1 . For example, when a user who entered to check his bank account balance has
gone into (the higher privileges) editing mode of account information, like the
pass-code, usually has to go through more authentication. The game reaches this state

• when the user successfully receives the privileges by the administrator to move
from the Low_Privilege_State.The user should chose the action Privilege_Request
and administrator should choose the action Promote, and depending on the
game’s stochasticity, if the transition succeeds, ξ2 is reached.
• when the user continues to operate with the privileges granted by the
administrator with neither attacking nor being trapped by administrator. That is,
13
Here we note that the Normal_Operation is an abstraction of the actions that are typical to that state
with no security consequences. Since they are going to be different at different states for both the players,
we denote each with different notation to distinguish them.
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when both the players are choosing Normal_Operation, depending on the
occurrence ratio the game could remain here.14
• when the user after successfully attacking the system in ξ3 and completing the
intended damage returns to operating as a High_Privilege user. The user should
choose Return_HPS, the administrator Normal_Operation_AS_A and the
transition should succeed.

A 0ξ ={Normal_Operation_AS_U (α020 ), Sign-Out_HPS(α021 ), Demote (α022 ),
2

Defend_HPS(α023 ), Trap_HPS(α024 )}
A 1ξ ={Normal_Operation_AS_A (α120 ), Sign-Out_Request_HPS(α121 ), Privilege_Relinquish
2

(α122 ), Attack_HPS (α123 ), Resist_HPS (α124 )}
ξ3 = Attack_State: In this state the user has already attacked the system successfully.
He is either accessing other’s confidential data or damaging the system or doing some
other harm. Here either he is doing some normal operations which is actually some
attacking activity or eloping along with the confidential data, or returning to legitimate
behavior with either high or low privileges into ξ1 & ξ2 . He would be concerned to wipe
out as much as possible any trace of his attack before he goes away. In this state
administrator can revive the system, which is like restarting a file server for example, if
the file server is found compromised. This can accompany with sending the suspected
user either out of the system or to honeypot taking the game to ξ4 with the action
Trap_AS. The game reaches this state
• when the user successfully attacks from the ξ1 .
14

Alternatively, when the transitions from ξ2 fail to reach the three other states, the game could remain
in this state as shown in the Figure 1.
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• when the user successfully attacks from the ξ2 .
• when the user succeeds to behave inconspicuously with Normal_Operation
continuing to damage the system. 15
• when the transitions to ξ1 , ξ2 & ξ3 fails as per the stochasticity of the system.

A 0ξ ={Normal_Operation_AS_A (α030 ), Sign-Out_AS(α031 ), Revive_LPS (α032 ), Revive_HPS
3

(α033 ), Trap_AS(α034 )}
A 1ξ ={Normal_Operation_AS_U(α130 ), Sign-Out_Request_AS(α131 ), Increase_Attack (α132 ),
3

Return_LPS (α133 ), Return_HPS (α134 )}
ξ4 = Trap_State: In this state, the administrator, after suspecting the user while in
ξ1 , ξ2 & ξ3 to be an attacker, and has successfully sent him to the honey pot. In this state
user could either enact Normal_Operation actions, or with a suspicion of being trapped
can do Sign-Out-Request action, which is either trying to close all his operations and
logging out at the earliest or engage with the administrator in his ploy behaving like a
benign user. User can also confirm his malicious intention by enacting it during the
enquiry. The game reaches this state

• when the administrator successfully traps in to Honeypot a user suspecting him
of some malicious intention.

• when the user with no malicious intention continues to do Normal_Operation
oblivious of being trapped and the administrator continuous to observe him at
15

The game reaches this state when the user’s attempt to transit to the normal state is unsuccessful. This
is typical of a situation when the traces are not getting wiped out even though the user is trying to get back
to the guise of a normal user.

47

Honeypot. Alternatively ξ4 is reached when a user with malicious intention
becomes suspicious of being trapped starts behaving.

• when the user who originally had malicious intention may try to attack at the
false targets provided by the administrator and try to escape by choosing the
Sign-Out-Request action, but does not succeed.

• when the administrator identifies the user who has successfully attacked the
system and decides to trap him into honeypot while the user is either trying to
return to ξ1 & ξ2 .
In each of these actions the user engages with the administrator’s ploy. In the end
administrator may declare either the user innocent and let him back in to the system
through the ξ1 or catch him and take further punitive actions. The fact that the user
already created suspicion, makes the administrator to let him back to the ξ1 , and let
him earn his higher privileges, than to directly enter ξ2 .
A 0ξ ={Normal_Operation_TS_A (α040 ), Sign-Out_TS (α041 ), Test_TS(α042 ), Judge_TS(α043 ),
4

Allow_TS(α044 )} A 1ξ ={Normal_Operation_TS_U (α140 ), Sign-Out_Request_TS
4

(α141 ),Commit (α143 ), Behave (α143 ),}
Consequently, the action sets of the players are summarized as below.
User_Action_Space =A 1
= {α111 , α112 , α113 , α114 , α115 , α121 , α122 , α123 , α124 , α131 , α132 , α133 , α134 , α135 , α141 , α142 , α143 }.
Administrator_Action_Space = A 2
= {α211 , α212 , α213 , α214 , α215 , α221 , α222 , α223 , α224 , α225 , α231 , α232 , α233 , α234 , α241 , α242 , α243 }.
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With the above information about the states and actions, the other 6 components of
the 9−tuple, E 1 , E 2 ,Q, R 1 , R 2 , β are suitably designed reflecting the system in question.
We present a numerical simulation with one such typical set of values in section 3.8.

3.7 Game Analysis
As the general case, each of the five states being perceived with a non-zero
probability at each state would make the whole action space of the player as the
extended action set at each state. But for the game to go into fifth state administrator
has to explicitly take the user out of the main system and put into the honeypot. Since
neither the stochasticity of the game nor the user can accidentally take the game to this
state, administrator wont mistake to be in it while being in the other states. Thus,
p 0j = 0 for j 6= i & j = 4, while 0 ≤ p 0j &
i

PN

i

0
i =1 p j i

= 1, 1 ≤ j , i , ≤ N . Thus,

I ξ0 = {ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 }, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Hence, the extended action set corresponding to the
j

information set would be for j 6= 4, B ξ0 =
j

{α000 , α001 , α010 , α011 , α012 , α013 , α014 , α020 , α021 , α022 , α023 , α024 , α030 , α031 , α032 , α033 , α034 , α040 , α041 , α042 , α043
, α044 }. In the Trap state the administrator’s response tries to delude the user about
his current state to be his preferred state. We consider the user’s sensor to be perfect in
general, which is the worst case scenario. Thus user’s view of the states can be defined
as p 1j = 0 if j 6= i , j 6= 4.p 1j = 1 if j = i & j 6= 4. Since the user can also have a honey pot
i

i

detection system p 414 > 0. The administrator’s ploy at ξ4 need not be only passive
reactive one, a motivation for a proactive one is suggested with the carrot and stick
approach in [67]. [34] & [13] discuss such scenarios where the inquiry into the nature
and motivation of the attacker are discussed.
Based on the above strictures, the game was simulated and evaluated for rewards to
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find the preferred strategy profiles.

3.8 Simulation
The game starts only after a sensor reporting an anomalous action by a user. Thus
there is a suspicion in the admin and a plausibility of malice in the user. At this stage it
is both an incomplete and imperfect information game, with the admin not being sure
of both the user’s nature and the current state of the game. The rewards for each
affecting feature of the game are symbolically distributed over the discrete space
defined by −1000, −100, −10, 0, 10, 100, 1000. The logarithmically varied values are
chosen to represent how the expense of actions and potential outcomes of actions
differ. Though it has to be fine tuned for the different attacks based on the specifics this
setup gives us a general idea. Taking a Normal_Operation action and for the
administrator and the user is a low expense action to attempt and execute in the
context of the game. Thus it leads to 0 pay off for both of them in ξ1 & ξ2 . Similarly the
sign-out request from the user and the sign-out from the admin also leads to a high
probability exit of the user from the system. This does not progress the interaction
further, but leads to a logical non-antagonizing move. That way the payoff to both is 10,
which is not nothing, but not much.
When the user chooses to attack and the admin chooses the action defend, the
attack is least likely to succeed. This also reveals the user’s intention to attack to the
admin. Thus this leads to -100 for the user and 100 for the admin. Similarly, when
admin chooses the action ‘trap‘ and the user chooses ‘resist‘, the administrator’s action
is least likely to succeed. This also makes the user aware that the admin is trying to trap
him, and thus he may start behaving leading to no chance of discovery by the
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administrator of his real motive with malice, if there was one. This would hence result
in -100 to the admin and 100 to the user. These figures are also considered due to the
expense of resources to take these actions and the actions impact on the game.

Figure 3.4: Below-Average-User:TL-AR,TR-UR

The basic idea is the aggressive actions are the most expensive actions for the
players. The exact defensive actions will result in least likelihood of succeeding the
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Figure 3.5: Below-Average-User:BL-ARS,BR-URS
aggressive actions by the opponents. These defensive actions are also second most
expensive actions to attempt/execute. The aggression will also yield higher payoff to
the player than the defending one, if succeeds. When one player takes an aggressive
action, the other player taking Normal_Operation or general state transiting actions will
lead to greater loss to him and higher gain to the aggressor. This game dynamics at
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Figure 3.6: Average-User:TL-AR,TR-UR
state ξ1 is explained in Appendix A.1.
For computational reasons we restricted the simulation with some constraints. The
game was programmed in C on a Debian7.6 of GNU/Linux on an Intel® CoreTM i5
Processor with 4GB RAM machine.

1. We ran the simulation with 100 strategies each varying in a gradation of
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Figure 3.7: Average-User:BL-ARS,BR-URS
aggression.
2. We find an approximate Equilibrium.16
16

The problem of finding the optimal exact Nash Equilibrium efficiently in the general case is challenging. Many progressive efforts are reported as discussed in section 5.4. We plan to progress on those results
in our future work. We here calculate an ²-Approximate Equilibrium(AE) for an example of the stochastic
game presented in 3.6. Traditionally, ²-AE in a stochastic game is defined as the strategy profile, where
no player can improve his expected average reward more than ² by unilateral strategy deviation.We introduce another variation ²-Neighborhood Optimal Strategy Profile (²-NOSP)|0 ≤ ² < 1 here as discussed in
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Figure 3.8: Above-Average-User:TL-AR,TR-UR
3. We ran it for three types of users/attackers and delineate the findings.We
simulated the games with each player 100 strategies, playing each 100 times. For
better visualization purpose we plot rewards for 10 strategies (whose results are
representative of the results with larger range) to cover the aggression, with steps
Appendix A.4.
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Figure 3.9: Above-Average-User:BL-ARS,BR-URS
of 0.1 from 0 to .9 at figures 3.5,3.7 & 3.9.17

The simulation was conducted with three user profiles in terms of skill, sophistication
and effectiveness as Below_Average, Average and Above_Average users. When in
17
TL⇒ Top Left,TR⇒Top Right, BL⇒ Bottom Left,BR⇒ Bottom Right, AR⇒Admin Reward,UR⇒User
Reward,ARS⇒Admin Reward Values Over 100 Executions with (.5)mid level aggression for both in the
Strategy Profile,URS⇒User Reward Values Over 100 Executions with (.5)mid level aggression for both in
the Strategy Profile.
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Low_Privilege_State, the Average user would attack and the Administrator defends,
playing the perfect antagonization, there is .5 probability that attack succeeds. This
way he is on par with the administrator in terms of imposing his will on the system
operation. Numerically the Below_Average user would have <.5 probability to be
succeed while the Above_Average user >.5 in such a situation. As this example
illustrates the essential characteristics, all other transitions are similarly poised.

3.8.1 Results
Since the game is stochastic, for the same strategy profile there could be different
rewards for the players. So, we ran the game for each strategy profile for 100 times, and
picked the average reward. We evaluate a preferred strategy in terms of the discretized
gradation of aggression as discussed in Appendix A.4. Figures 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9 show the
rewards of administrator and the users and the spread of rewards during multiple
executions for a typical strategy profile.
We found many ²-NOSPs with ² = 0.01 and a different prescribed one in each case.
The prescription is based on the least likelihood of the attacker wanting to deviate,
hence the chance of game going as expected his higher.

Below_Average User (BAU)
(7, 2) is the prescribed ²−NOSP. It recommends for the user and administrator to be
least aggressive. The game starts with some anomaly by user and thus if the user is
perceived as a BAU, then both players are better off to curtail their aggression.
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Average User (AU)
(8, 6) is the prescribed ²−NOSP. It recommends for the user to be less aggressive as
he is more affective while the administrator to be relatively more aggressive.

Above_Average User (AAU)
(4, 1) is the prescribed ²−NOSP. It recommends for the user and administrator to be
least aggressive.
Among the possible strategies of players, graded on aggression, this gives a
preference for achieving optimal reward. Based on these results, we can infer that
during the interaction, due the combination of factors like capacity for domination and
secrecy of intent, the players are better off to do most action when its most
advantageous to them.
Conjecture 1: The aggression needed by the administrator for achieving equilibrium
follows normal distribution over the power of the user, with the mean at the power of
both being equal, while interacting with same reward functions and discount factor.
Conjecture 2: The aggression needed by the administrator for achieving the
equilibrium would vary from linear to Normal distribution as the depth of the game tree
increases, for the same reward functions and the user. The depth of the game tree is a
function of discount factor and threshold discount.
The game presented deals with the interaction between the administrator and a
single user. The generic nature of its design lends modeling an n-players game also.
The interaction of many users both malicious and benign, with administrator can be
modeled effectively. We can investigate many different structures in such an

58

interaction in the next section.

3.9 n-Player Game
The game model presented in section 3.5, considers n, n ∈ Z, 0 < n < ∞ players
where the interactions between many users and administrators can be modeled. As
practicality alludes, considering a single administrator would be convenient and useful
for most cases. Thus the interaction between many users and an administrator is
interesting to investigate. In such a situation, the users can be disparate and working
on their disjoint motivations. They could also be working as a group. On the other
hand, the administrator can be interacting separately with many users or interact with
a group of users with actions collectively affecting all of them. In the light of the game
model and game we presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6 respectively, we derive the
conditions of the group behavior and reaction of administrator to a group to be
optimal.
For each state j , let r jk

max

be the reward associated with the preferred action choice

of the user k. During the course of the game, if

P j =ξ f
j =ξi

r jk

max

<

P j =ξ f
j =ξi

r jk , k ∈ S k with
co

S k = {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k a } where r jk =⇒ reward of k t h player at j t h state when taking
co

co-operative actions, a is the number of users who have motivations that can be
pursued in co-operation. There are two trees of game progress that are considered
here. In the first case, when each player takes action to fully maximize his total reward
during the sequence of game play, he is trying to maximize the probability of those
state which maximizes his reward. While doing so two such players may make the
game progression such that the final resulting sequence of game play gives both a total
reward which is far below their maximum possible value. But this value can be lower
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than a compromised game transition sequence in which both have higher probability
to make higher reward. Recognizing this point, would be the threshold to co-operate.
.
Secondly, when there are two or more similarly engaged users, responding
individually can be expensive for the administrator. Also a response to one user may
require an action whose effects on the system conflict with the interaction with other
user. The motivating example is when a user who is accessing a particular web server is
behaving suspiciously, the admin may want to restart the web server and disconnect
the suspicious user. Simultaneously if another user is acting suspiciously with a
database server, which is also running on the same machine which has no other
processes active at this time, depending on the extent of threat by both the users, it may
be optimal for the administrator to reboot the operating system itself to address both
users. The condition is

Pg =n
g =1

r j max <

Pg =n
g =1

r j common where r j m ax and r j c ommon are the

rewards associated with the actions taken for each individual game towards optimal
reward, played with different users and the actions taken to collectively / commonly
affect all the users concerned. At this condition the administrator is better off playing a
single game considering all the users as a collective adversary.

3.10 On Engaging Suspicious Users
The only way the game enters the Trapped State ξ4 is from the other states . In the
other states , the administrator could become suspicious about a particular user. After
sufficient observation of such a behavior of the user, the administrator could become
sure that it is not safe to have that user operating freely in the network. For that
particular reason administrator sends him to honey pot. Then the game enters the
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Trapped State ξ4 . Then the administrator will have a belief about the user’s motive
based on these actions of user at one or more of the other states (ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 ) , when the
game enters ξ4 . For example, in a site offering the service of audio streaming but no
download, trying to download (successfully or not) could be a reason to put him in
Trapped State. The administrator holds the belief that the user wants to steal the audio
files. The administrator does not know conclusively yet, either the true nature or
motivation of the user. By nature, the user may be not an attacker, a naive attacker or
an advanced attacker. The motivation of the user is what exactly he/she intends to do
in the network. A normal user might have accidentally performed an action which was
not allowed. This uncertainty to the administrator entails to incomplete information in
the game play. All the further interactions of administrator’s ploy with the user is
abstracted to take place in a single state ξ4 of the main game in figure 1. Here, the prime
motivation of the administrator is to learn the ’original’ motivation of the user with the
minimum number of interactions to identify the nature and motivation of the user and
thus determine the suitable response. The administrator, based on his current belief
about the user’s nature and motivation, creates the situation in the state ξ4 .
Administrator provides some actions as choices for the user during each interaction
step, such that user’s actions give the maximum information about his identity. The
administrator has a finite set of such actions to offer the user to study his response.
Offering them all at once is not advisable as it confuses the user making him change the
original plan or become suspicious to altogether start behaving like a good user and
may even try to log out inconspicuously. So, the actions should be provided as options
at each step of this engagement to facilitate optimal user identification. Such a ploy can
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be characterized by the following structure to achieve this.
Ploy: Formal description: The administrator has a finite set of actions to offer to the
user. Let this set be

A pl oy = {αpl oy j , αpl oy j , αpl oy j , . . . , αpl oy j x }
0

1

2

(3.4)

where x is the total number of action-options that the administrator can offer at any
general step j in the interaction. Based on the belief about the motivation of user at the
time entering the ξ4 , the administrator associates a probability distribution over the set
A pl oy , to represent the expected user’s preference. p αpl oy is the probability with which
j

the user is expected to prefer to take the action αpl oy i in the step j while facing the
j

ploy. This implies
x
X

p a pl oy = 1

(3.5)

ji

i =1

Now the actions in the set A pl oy are sorted in descending order by their associated
probabilities.
A pl oy sor t ed = {αpl oy i , αpl oy i , . . . , αpl oy i x }

(3.6)

(p αpl oy ) ≤ (p αpl oy ), ∀k ≤ j.

(3.7)

0

1

where
i

i

Let the action set of the user at step 1 at ξ4 be

A 1pl oy 1 = {αpl oy 10 , αpl oy 11 , . . . , αpl oy 1 y }.
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(3.8)

And in general at any given step j the user action set would be

A 1pl oy j = {αpl oy j0 , αpl oy j1 , . . . , αpl oy j y }.

(3.9)

But this is essentially the similar looking action set as was in ξ1 or ξ2 or ξ3 to start
with from where the user landed in ξ4 . But the effect of the actions is different. As is
true for any mixed strategy game, there exists a Nash strategy profile for the user and
the administrator here too. This implies that there is an action guided by the user’s
Nash strategy, as identified/expected by the administrator, that the user is better off
taking at this step.Let αpl oy 1

nash

be that action in the step 1 in ξ4 . Administrator has to

add/remove an action/ actions at each step of interaction, to make the probability of
the user taking actions as per Nash strategy, equiprobable with respect to user’s current
action set. This leads us to the following theorem.
Theorem 1: In an incomplete information game, when the action prescribed by the
Nash-strategy for a user is equiprobable with respect to other possible actions at a given
state, the action selection is solely influenced by the original motivation of the player 18 .
The player’s selecting the prescribed action is a sufficient condition for the confirmation
of the expected motivation(belief of payoff of user).
Proof:

Py
∼
=

p α1

pl oy j

1=1 p αpl oy 1

ji

− p α1

pl oy j

nash

jy − 1

nash

(3.10)

Where j y is the number of actions in the current action set at step j . The main rationale
is that the situation artificially created at the trapped state neither dissuade not
18

and not by any reactionary behavior towards other players
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encourage the user to take the action α1pl oy j

nash

. Administrator cannot infer well if he

makes the user do the action administrator choose for user. From the point of
information to the user, he has as much information as he could with choice in
background. The average information/ Shannon-entropy given to him is at its
maximum. As established in 3.5 we have

1
(I pl
oy j )max =

y
X
i =1

l og (1/p α1

p α1

pl oy j

i

pl oy j

)

(3.11)

i

1
where I pl
=⇒ Average information over action set.
oy
j

p α1

pl oy j

=
i

1
, ∀ ji , 1 ≤ ji
ji

≤y

Even though all the individual actions may not be equiprobable for user’s selection,
the main concern is regarding the action prescribed by the Nash strategy and its
probability of being selected. From equations 3.3 and 3.4, administrator has ensured
that, if user takes the Nash action, then he is doing it at a maximum average
information situation. This allows the sufficient confirmation to justify the previous
belief. How ever if the user takes a different action then it also provides the direction for
updating the belief. In either case, the administrator is not influencing the user’s
decisions and thus getting the most effective learning about user’s original intention.
The equation 3.7 gives the ideal situation. But the minima of absolute value of the
difference between LHS and RHS is to be considered for practical purpose. When the
difference is positive then the administrator is dissuading the user and when it is
negative he is encouraging the user from perusing the expected behavior. Both disturb
the objective observation. Hence the absolute minimum difference as shown above is
the best administrator can do.
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Based on the results presented here, we present a security architecture next in the
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4

Security Architecture

This chapter presents the security architecture based on the game theoretic work
in the Chapter 3. The architecture with a block diagram, description of the blocks and
some initial implementation details are presented here.
The security system is envisioned to be an event-driven system. Thus, when there is
an anomaly observed by the sensors the security system starts to engage with the user
or process causing it. Figure 4.10 shows the event flow of a security situation. In the
next section, Figure 4.1 shows the block diagram of the architecture. The description
contains what are the blocks and their connections. We refer for historical reasons, the
security architecture as Game Inspired Defense Architecture GIDA.

4.1 Architecture
There are 8 blocks. They are

1. Target System: It is the system which is being protected by the GIDA system. As is
prevalent, such a system would be a network of many internal systems belonging
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to that organization. All the interaction with other blocks happen through the
Sensors & Actuators blocks. It is having a two-way data link and a two-way
control-signal link with the Sensors & Actuators block.
2. Internet: This block is the external world with which the target system
communicates during its operation. The system has no control over the form and
content of what happens there and should only deal with what comes from it,
into itself. The interaction of data coming in and going out into the Internet from
the system happens through the Sensors & Actuators.
Thus there is a data link with the Sensors & Actuators block. 1
3. Sensors : This block is the channel through which all the interactions happen
between the Internet and the target system. The sensors and actuators are a bit
indistinguishable functionally in terms of distinct systems as interactivity of the
system components is maturing with technology. For example, even though
Firewall keeps a gate to disallow some traffic as per the prescribed policies, it also
gives a count of what is the attempted traffic and the one that does go through, to
the defense system. In the first function it is acting as an actuator while in the
second as a sensor. But the predominantly sensing components are put into
sensors.
4. Actuators: This block has the actuators.
It is having both a two-way data link and two-way control-signal link with the
block Target System and a data link with the block Internet.
1

Though there is a possibility of getting some control-signal information, like requesting the ISP to
provide some traffic related information, it is not represented here with a control-link signal link, as its
not a regular event and not quantitatively salient.
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Figure 4.1: GIDA 1.2
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5. Knowledge Management System: KMS: This is the knowledge center where the
information related to the observed anomalies is sent in and a defense action
plan is got as the output to the GIDA Control Unit block. To do the attack
identification effectively, an up to date knowledge is needed about the attacks,
risks, vulnerabilities etc. There are many online government databases
maintaining such knowledge bases. This block keeps itself updated from those
knowledge bases and reports to them its own findings.
There is a two-way data link and a two-way control link to the GIDA Control Unit
block. There is also a two-way data link with the External Defense knowledge
Systems block.

6. Honeypot: This block is the trap to which a suspected user is sent, to understand
his intentions when his activity raises enough alarm through the sensors to
consider it unsafe to let him interact with the main system.
It has a two-way data link and a two-way control link to the Sensors & Actuators
block.

7. External Defense knowledge Systems: This block is the online knowledge bases
related to attacks, vulnerabilities, risks etc. There is a two-way data link with
Knowledge Management System: KMS block.

8. GIDA Control Unit: This block is the central control unit, for the whole defense
operation of GIDA. It is connected to the Sensors & Actuators which intimates
when there is any anomaly observed. This starts the involvement of this unit. As
and when required it sends control signals to Sensors & Actuators to abort a
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traffic or operation, divert it to Honeypot or communicate with the Knowledge
Management System: KMS to decide what to do.
As the initial steps in implementing the architecture systemically, the framework to
build sensors was developed. The attack identification system called Issue Resolution
System was developed. In the following sections, we elaborate on each block.

4.2 Target System
The systems which are to be secured are those having valuable assets. It would
typically contain the usual subsystems that make up any of the present day industrial
business system, like database server , web server, confidential files, etc. In a cloud
based system, this would mean a set of processes, which operating in tandem, to
accomplish a well defined task. The processes may be operating on different hardware
and software infrastructures, physically based in different locations communicating
through different channels and/or the Internet. The task could be to provide a service
to other clients remotely accessing it. The important parameters of the target system
for the security architecture are the following.
1. The number and nature of valuable assets needed to be secured.
2. The kind and nature of exposure the system has with the external world, through
connections coming over the Internet etc,
3. The extent to which instrumentation is possible to deploy the monitors to detect
anomalies to act as sensors.
4. The extent to which the actuators can be controlled to take timely discretionary
actions which decides the action set of the administrator/ security system.
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5. The nature and number of actions, external users or processes which are
potential threats, can take at each step of the interaction which decides in total
their action set.

6. The components of the whole target system which have their list of
vulnerabilities and history of previous exploits.

4.3 Internet
The external world from which we the target system interacts, which is the location
and source of the users and client processes, is abstracted as the Internet. Many a
times, some of the target systems communicate only with a very restricted set of
external users or processes which can be located remotely but not actually connected
to the Internet. The important parameters of this source of external interaction are the
following.

1. The number of users that can simultaneously interact who can cause security
situations.

2. The number of users who can co-operate to work in tandem to effect a complex
attack.

3. The robustness of the authentication with which the users establish the
connection to interact against compromises which is difficult for the target
system to investigate or determine inexpensively.

4. The reliability of the channels which are used to communication with the
external users for both reliability and privacy against any compromise.
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4.4

Sensors

The sensors determine what are the valuable assets in the target system whose
security being monitored. The requirement properties that are needed to be preserved
and what types of violations of them should cause for the engagement of the security
system is determined by the sensors. The range and precision of values of parameters
which are being monitored and responded to, determines sensitivity of the whole
architecture and the systems deployed based on it in securing the target system. In
striking the balance between a false negatives and false positives, the sensors have an
important role. Their evolution would eventually lead to considering not just
instantaneous values but the behavior pattern of the values of the parameters in
preserving/violating the requirement properties.
The important features of the devices / processes acting as sensors are as follows.

1. The values of the parameters whose variation can be monitored and responded
to.

2. The access to the processes in the target system which operate on the valuable
assets.

3. The delay in registering the changes in values of parameters.

4. The operational overload the monitoring has on the system operation.

Here the initial framework for developing runtime monitors as sensors is presented.
There is an increase in the usage of online services for social and commercial
activities. This makes the reliability of the software systems providing these online
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services increasingly important. Though careful design and testing can reduce errors in
these systems, they cannot ensure complete reliability because the systems can behave
unexpectedly during run time.The deviation in the observed behavior from the
expected behavior of the software systems is termed as software anomaly. To detect
such anomalies there is a need for run-time monitoring. Monitors facilitating it are to
be constructed by identifying the monitorable properties of the software systems. [74]
explored the motivations and foundations of run time monitoring. Similar works in
[22, 27, 8, 31, 42, 50] explore the formal frame works for establishing the safety and
monitorable properties. These monitors form the sensors for the security systems
which ensure the security of the target systems.
The anomalies may be caused due to internal errors in the software system or
interference by external agencies with malicious intentions. Such anomalies must be
detected by the run time monitors. To construct the monitors we need to identify the
monitorable property in the software system. To identify the monitorable properties we
need both full access2 to its code and the specified requirement3 . By accessing the code
the nodes are identified following the work in[30]. Using these nodes we construct a
control flow graph and identify all the execution paths in it. Using these execution
paths and requirements we identify the monitorable properties. We express the
identified properties using logical formalism that can be used in the run time
monitoring tools to build the monitor. There are many such tools available as discussed
in [11]. In our experiment, we used a freely available tool called JavaMop, whose details
2

If we don’t have full access to the system’s code we should have our own program which concurrently
run sniffing some system parameters, whose values indicating the performance of the applications we
want to monitor. Then designing some control flow delineation in the program depending on the values
of the observed parameter, we can construct a monitor for this sniffing program.
3
Some researchers refer to this as requirement property

73

are discussed in [5] and [6].
In this work we present two examples which are simplified versions of real life
scenarios. In the first example, due to an internal error of redundancy in the database,
there is a run time anomaly. In the second example, due to the malicious input by a
user, who takes undue advantage of the Java program allowing him to execute directly a
command using the function "exec", creates the anomaly due to "OS command
injection".
The monitors we construct in this work are designed to act as the sensors in a
security system implementing the defense architecture called GIDA, Game theory
Inspired Defense Architecture as described in GIDA aims to provide quantifiable defense
mechanisms to real world security problems by modeling them as multi-player games.
It has three main components: attack identification system, a game model repository
and a game decision system. The output of the sensors go into the attack identification
system to identify the attack using an attack taxonomy as in [68]. The more precise the
information gathered by the sensors, more accurate the attack identification would be.
The main contributions of this work are follows.
1. We combine two prior works to construct a procedure to identify the monitorable
property starting from the program code and the specified requirement.
2. We provide two examples with run time anomalies; one caused by an internal
error and another by an external agency with malicious intentions. We built
monitors for both of them which act as sensors to the security system.
The section 4.4.1 describes the formal procedure constructed by adapting from the
prior works [30] & [29], to identify the monitorable property in the target program.
74

Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 present examples with a run time anomaly caused by an
internal error and by an external user with malicious intentions respectively. We apply
the formal procedure described in the next section, to these examples to identify the
monitorable properties and construct monitors accordingly.

4.4.1 Monitorable property Identification Procedure (MIP)
In this section we describe a procedure to identify monitorable properties based on
[30] and [29].
Given the target program we identify the following statements in it:

• an assignment statement,

• an input or output statement,

• a procedure call statement,

• an procedure entry statement,

• an go to, break, continue or label statement,

• a predicate of conditional or loop statement.

These statements in the given program are represented as nodes, denoted by the
symbol s i . The subscript i in the symbol s i , represents where the statement appears in
the program from the beginning.
The potential control flow between these nodes corresponds to arc. With the nodes
as vertices and arcs as the edges, the program is represented as a control flow graph.
This graph is a directed graph and every path ( which is a sequence of nodes) in it,
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starting with the vertex (representing the invocation of program execution) is
identified.
A program in execution is a process. When the process is observed at successively
different instants of time, a node in execution could be seen. Thus, a node in control
flow graph corresponds to a state in the process.The set of all valid states is denoted by
S.The transition between states define how the process is progressing, that is, how the
program is getting executed. The state at which the process is in at the instant of its
invocation is called its initial state.
Formally execution is defined as an infinite sequence. By repeating the terminating
state in the paths obtained we construct the infinite sequences representing the
execution. Such an infinite sequence of process states, starting with an initial state and
each successive states s i , 0 < i < ∞ being a valid state, that is s i ∈ S, 0 ≤ i < ∞,
representing an execution is given by

σ = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . .).

(4.1)

It should be noted that the order of the states in the execution need not follow the
subscript order of nodes obtained from the program, as it is only decided by the flow of
execution.
Thus all the executions σi , 0 < i < ∞ are obtained. By dropping the initial elements
in the sequence of these executions, many infinite sequences are created which
represent a later part of an execution in the process. That is by dropping an initial state
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in the execution above, which may be called σ1 , another σ11 is created, as given by

σ11 = (s 1 , s 2 , . . .).

(4.2)

Now the infinite set of all infinite sequences of all permutations of s i , s i ∈ S (which also
contains all the executions and the later parts of executions like in equation 4.2), is
denoted by S ω is constructed, as given by

S ω = {(s 1 , s 1 , s 1 , . . .), (s 2 , s 2 , s 2 , . . . ), . . . , σ1 , σ11 , . . . , σ2 , σ3 , . . .}

(4.3)

Property is defined as a set of executions.

P = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , . . .}

(4.4)

A property P ⊆ S ω is a safety property P sa f e if for every sequence σ ∈ P ,for every prefix
of σ, there exists a sequence β ∈ S ω which when appended will make the resulting
sequence to be a member of the set P . This means in essence that the sequences σs
contain as each element states only from S.
The executions belonging to the safety property are called safe executions. If σ1 , σ2 ,
σ3 and σ4 are safe executions, then

P sa f e = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , . . .}

(4.5)

Prefix of an execution is an initial subsequence of the execution and it represents the
execution of the process from the beginning up to some finite number of states. We
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define the set pr e f (σi ) as a set of all the finite prefixes of the execution σi . For example
consider the execution σ1 and the set of all its finite prefixes, denoted as pr e f ( σ1 ),
given by
pr e f (σ1 ) = {(s 0 ), (s 0 , s 1 ), (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ), . . .}

(4.6)

The union of all the sets of prefixes of each executions in P sa f e , is given by pr e f (P sa f e ).
During the union operation the elements which are common are collapsed into a single
element, as there can not be any repetition of members in the set. That is, the first
element in the sets pr e f (σ1 ), pr e f (σ2 ), pr e f (σ3 ) and pr e f (σ4 ), which is the finite
prefix of length 1 of σ1 , σ2 , σ3 and σ4 is the same, which is (s 0 ). But during the union
there will be only one element (s 0 ) in pr e f (P sa f e ). Thus we have,

pr e f (P sa f e ) = ∪σ∈P sa f e pr e f (σ)

(4.7)

A safety property P sa f e is a monitorable property P moni t or abl e , when S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is
Turing recognizable. That is after examining a given execution, if we are able to
determine in finite steps, if that execution is not in the set P sa f e then it is a monitorable
property. Thus from the safety property we construct a monitorable property as given
by,
P moni t or = {σ1 , σ2 , . . .}

(4.8)

Once the above set, monitorable property is identified, we have to get a more useful
definition of this set to be able to build a monitor for it.
Now we use the second given information, that is the specified requirement and
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identify the monitored variables,

Vm = {v ar i abl e 1 , v ar i abl e 2 , . . .}

(4.9)

that are affecting the requirement. Then we construct the expressionexp Vm , which
cover the specified requirement. If one expression is not feasible we may have to
construct multiple expressions in complicated cases. Then we create the function valid
value abstraction γexp Vm . Its domain is S ω and its range is S ∞ . This function takes the
executions as input and gives out smaller sequences, of states which affect the
expression exp Vm , and abstracts the rest of the states.
If ∀e ∈ exp Vm .[e]si = [e]si +1
γexp Vm [s i s i +1 σ0 ] = γexp Vm [s i σ0 ]
if ∃e ∈ exp Vm .[e]si 6= [e]si +1
γexp Vm [s i s i +1 σ0 ] = s i γexp Vm [s i +1 σ0 ]
Thus,
γexp Vm : S ω → S ∞

(4.10)

where σ0 is an infinite sequence of states and e si for e ∈ exp Vm is the result of evaluating
the expression over s i , with i > 0.
The smaller subsequence obtained contains the states, whose corresponding nodes
define in terms of code the property to be monitored. Based on this, using the
monitoring tools a monitor is constructed. This is duly illustrated in the examples in
the next sections. Whenever during an execution we are monitoring, this property
which is defining the set is violated, it becomes an unsafe execution path. As there
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exists no possibility on the way this unsafe execution can undo this anomaly to become
again a safe execution, it does not belong to the set P sa f e .

P unsa f e = {σx1 , σx2 , σx3 , . . .}

(4.11)

Here x 1 , x 2 , x 3 are some natural numbers used as subscripts, to identify some execution
which are not the members of the set P sa f e and thus members of PUnsa f e . Using the
monitor constructed the first transition which makes the sequence deviate from being
a safe execution will be detected and appropriate action is taken like raising an alarm
or sending a message to the server.

4.4.2 The sensor detecting violation of monitorable property due to
internal problem
Many current day websites have databases of the information about their
registered users. Such information about the users is crucial to modulate the websites’
services to suit the users behavior/needs, to profile the website for advertisements and
other maintenance related works.We construct a simplified version of this scenario
using a Java program. The program uses XAMPP web server for using the services like
Apache HTTP and MySQL. A Java based tool named Java-MOP is used to generate the
monitors to monitor the executing Java program. 4 The Java program uses a database
named registered users that contains a table named personalinfo with three columns
namely username, password and visits. The program has user defined functions,
username () and password () which receive two strings for username and password via
4

The implementation of example as a Java program was done by my co-author in the paper [66], Ramya
Dharam.
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the command line respectively from the user.The program then compares the
username and password entered with corresponding column values of all the rows in
the personalinfo table. When a matching is found in row, the program invokes
executeUpdate () function to increment the visits column by one. If there is a
redundancy in the database, the Java program calls the executeupdate() function
multiple times for a single visit. Such an execution is not a safe execution. This
anomaly leads to inaccurate records of visits in the database.
The code of the Java program we described until now, is given below. As described
in section 2, nodes are identified in this program. They are denoted by s i where i starts
from 1 for the first node and goes on. They are shown in the comment area of the
corresponding Java statement that generated it.

import java.sql.*;
import javax.sql.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
public class jdbcdemo{ // s 1 .
static String triLine1,strLine2 ;
public void username() // s 2 .
{System.out.println("Enter the username"); // s 3
Scanner in = new Scanner (System.in);// s 4
strLine1 = in.nextLine();}// s 5
public void password() // s 6
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{ System.out.println("Enter the password");// s 4
Scanner in = new Scanner (System.in);// s 8
strLine2 = in.nextLine();}// s 9
public static void main (String args[ ])// s 10
{String dbname, dbpassword;
int c;
jdbcdemo ob1 = new jdbcdemo();// s 11
ob1.username();// s 12
ob1.password();// s 13
String dburl = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/student";// s 14
String username = "root";// s 15
String password = "PASSWORD"; // s 16
String dbClass = "com.mysql.jdbc.Driver"; // s 17
String query1 = "Select * FROM personalinfo"; // s 18
String query2 = "Update personalinfo set visits = visits+1 where username = ’"+strLine1+"’ and
password = ’"+strLine2+"’"; // s 19
String query3 = "Select count(*) as usercount from personalinfo where username =
’"+strLine1+"’ and password =’"+strLine2+"’"; // s 20
class.for.Name("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver");// s 21
Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection (dbUrl,username,password);// s 22
Statement stmt = con.createStatement();// s 23
Statement stmt1 = con.createStatement();// s 24
Statement stmt2 = con.createStatement();// s 25
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PreparedStatement pstmt = null;// s 26
ResultSet rs1 = stmt2.executeQuery(query3);// s 27
if(rs1.next() == true)// s 28
{if(rs1.getInt("usercount") >0 )// s 29
{ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query1);// s 30
while(rs.next())// s 31
{dbname = rs.getString(1);// s 32
dbpassword = rs.getString(2);// s 33
if(strLine1.equals(dbname) & & strLine2.equals(dbpassword))// s 34
{pstmt = con.prepareStatement(query2);// s 35
pstmt.executeUpdate();// s 36
}}/*end of while*/
ResultSet res1 = stmt1.executeQuery("SELECT SUM(visits) FROM personalinfo");// s 37
while (res1.next())// s 38
{c = res1.getInt(1);// s 39
System.out.println("Sum of column = " + c); // s 40
}/* end of while */
System.out.println(" \n Thank You"); // s 41
}else // s 42
{System.out.println("Authentication Failed"); // s 43
}}} //end try
catch(ClassNotFoundException e) { // s 44
e.printStackTrace(); // s 45
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}catch(SQLException e) { // s 46
e.printStackTrace(); // s 47
} } //end main } //end class

Now we define the set all the nodes obtained above as S, given by
S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 ,
s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , es 44 , s 45 , s 46 , s 47 }
The figure below represents the control flow diagram obtained as mentioned in section
2.

Figure 4.2: Control Flow Graph-1

From this graph we obtain the following two paths as described in section 4.4.1.
P at h 1 = (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 ,
s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , (s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 )+ , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 )+ , s 41 )
This path5 is obtained when the user enters a username and password which exist in
the database. Then the value in the visit column corresponding to the row of matching
username and password in the database table is incremented.
P at h 2 = (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25
, s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 42 , s 43 )
5

Here there is an order in the possible repetition of the three two subsequences, indicated by the symbol we adopt from that used usually to indicate repetition in regular expressions. Though each repetition
would create a distinct path, we collectively represent all of them by specifying these orders with this
single sequence.It must be noted that the repetitions still keep the length of the path finite.
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This path is obtained when the user enters an invalid username and password. This
login attempt gets rejected due to no match for the entered username and password is
found in the database.
These paths represent finite sequences of states. But the execution,σi , where i ∈ N
of a program is formally defined as an infinite sequence of states.To convert the above
finite sequences into infinite sequences, we repeat the terminal state infinite times.
Hence we create σ1 from P at h 1 such that,
σ1 = (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 ,
s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , (s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 )+ , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 )+ , s 41 , s 41 , . . .)
Similarly, we create σ2 respectively from P at h 2 . Now along σ1 we observe that
other infinite sequences σ11 , σ12 , σ13 , . . . σ138 created by dropping first, second, third, . . .
initial elements respectively are terminal subsequences of σ1 as shown below.
σ11 =
(s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 ,
s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , (s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 )+ , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 )+ , s 41 , s 41 , . . .)
Here it should be noted that σ138 sequence is an infinite sequence of s 41 , which is
the terminal state in σ1 6 . Similarly we construct from σ2 the infinite sequences
σ21 , σ22 , σ23 , . . .. By definition S ω is a set of all possible infinite sequences of s i ∈ S
including the above created infinite sequences of states.
S ω = {(s 1 , s 1 , s 1 , . . .), . . . , σ1 , σ11 , σ12 , σ13 , . . . , σ2 , σ21 , σ22 , σ23 , . . . , (s 47 , s 47 , s 47 , . . .)}
Now we have to note that, the repetitions get collapsed, so that no two elements are
same in the set S ω , like σ228 collapse into σ138 .The sequences above depict infinite paths
6

with no repetition considered
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in the control flow graph as if there was an edge from every state to another including to
itself. Using the executions got from the paths in graph we construct a set P as in
equation 4.4.
P = {σ1 , σ2 }
Such a set of executions is called a property and we observe that P ⊂ S ω . An
observation is made in these elements. After initial subsequence σ[0 . . . i ] in all the
elements in P , there exists an element β ∈ S ω , to make the whole sequence to belong to
the set P .Consider σ1 . Let i = 0. Then the initial subsequence σ[0] is (s 10 ). Then we
have a β ∈ S ω such that β = σ11 ,making the concatenated sequence to be a valid
member of P . This essentially means the elements of the sequences which are
members of the set P must be members of set S. As we can easily verify that, we
conclude as per equation 4.7, that the property P is called a safety property P sa f e . That
is, P sa f e = {σ1 , σ2 }.
Prefix of an execution is an initial subsequence of the execution. Consider σ1 . The
set of all the finite prefixes of σ1 is pr e f ( σ1 ), which is given as
pr e f (σ1 ) = {(s 10 ), (s 10 , s 11 ), (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 ), . . . (s 11 , s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , . . . , s 41 ), . . .}
Similarly we obtain the sets of prefixes of all the σs in P sa f e , which are, pr e f (σ2 ).We
define the set pr e f (P sa f e ) to be the set obtained by the union of the sets pr e f (σ1 ) and
pr e f (σ2 ). Thus we have,
pr e f (P sa f e ) = pr e f (σ1 ) ∪ pr e f (σ2 ) i.e. pr e f (P sa f e ) = {(s 10 , (s 10 , s 11 ), (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 ), . . . }
Now we prove that the set S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is Turing recognizable.
Proof. We observe that each of the elements in the set pr e f (P sa f e ) are of finite length
and so is the given sequence σt est , which is constructed one element at a time,
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corresponding to the monitoring of each state of the process since its invocation. Thus
we construct a Turing Machine/ algorithm below, which accepts a string if and only if it
does not belong to the set pr e f (P sa f e ).7
1. Before observing the first state of the test execution8 , set the length of σt est , L = 0.
2. Observe the next step of execution and build the test sequence σt est by one more
element and store it. Increment by one, the length variable L.

3. Pick all the sequences in the set pr e f (P sa f e ) of length L and create a set
pr e f (P sa f e L ).9
4. Now compare the test sequence σt est with the first element in the set
pr e f (P sa f e L ).10 If there are no elements in the set pr e f (P sa f e L ), then go to step 7.
5. If there is a match then go to step 2.

6. Else delete the picked element from the set pr e f (P sa f e L ), and go to step 4.
7. Declare that σt est is not in pr e f (P sa f e ) Stop.

The key point in the above proof is that, if something goes wrong in the execution to
make it unsafe, then it must happen after finite steps and thus it would be detected by
the above algorithm in finite steps.11 As P sa f e is a safety property and S ? /pr e f (P sa f e )
7

if the string does belong to the set pr e f (P sa f e ), it could reject or loop.
But since σt est is considered as an execution, we take it as an infinite sequence.
9
This set is a finite set as there are only finitely many possible sequences of any finite length, L Seq made
up of finite number of elements, as |S| < ∞
10
Do this iteratively by comparing each state by state.
11
Since every longer sequence in the set pr e f (P sa f e ), has all its prefixes as a valid member of the set of
smaller lengths, every possible valid sequence is covered in this example.
8
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is Turing recognizable, we conclude from equation 4.8, that the set P sa f e is a
monitorable property. Lets denote P sa f e from now onwards as P moni t or .Thus
P moni t or = {σ1 , σ2 }
We reiterate that the main goal of monitoring in the present example, is to detect if
there is any inconsistency in counting the visits by the registered users. This compels us
to be particularly interested in the states where the user login is facilitated and
updating the number of visit by the user is made.
In [29], some integer variables in the program code are the monitored variables.
While the Monitored variables, Vm in our example are Boolean variables user-login and
update-visit-count representing login attempt of user and the updating of the count of
registered user’s visits in the database. These variables do not appear in the program
code as variables. They correspond to the states in the execution facilitating the login
and corresponding updating of the visit-count. The Boolean variable user-login takes
value 1, when login attempt is successful. It takes the value 0, when the attempt is
unsuccessful. The Boolean variable update-visit-count takes the value 1 when there is
incrementing of the count by one. It takes the value 0 otherwise.
Vm = {user − l og i n, upd at e − vi si t − count }
The specified requirement in the example used in [29] is given by an algebraic
expression specifying the integer variables, and the accepted range for them, each
connected by a conjunction. In our example, the specified requirement is given by a
Boolean expression. The expression exp Vm over monitored variables Vm made to cover
the specified requirement is given below.
exp Vm = (((user − l og i n) ∧ (upd at e − vi si t − count ))∨
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((user − l og i n) ∧ (upd at e − vi si t − count )))
∧¬(((user − l og i n) ∧ (upd at e − vi si t − count )
(upd at e − vi si t − count )+ )∨
((user − l og i n) ∧ (upd at e − vi si t − count ))∨
((user − l og i n) ∧ (upd at e − vi si t − count )+ ))
The above expression is a conjunction of two expressions. The first expression consists
of the what should happen and the second consists of negation of what should not
happen. The first expression has two parts connected by a disjunction; first one
indicates a successful login and a successful updating of count while the second a
failure of both. The second expression has three parts connected by disjunction.The
first one indicates a successful login corresponding to multiple updating of the visit
count. Second one indicates a successful login with out corresponding updating of
count of visit. The third one indicates an unsuccessful login corresponding to multiple
updating of the visit count. This motivates to monitor the subsequence of states which
affect the variables Vm determining the evaluation of exp Vm .
The abstraction of the states from the whole sequence12 , which do not affect the
evaluation of the specified requirement as covered by exp Vm , is the function called
value abstraction. γexpVm . We note that, the variable user-login is operated on/ gets
effected during the subsequence between states s 12 and s 13 . The variable
updating-visit-count is operated on/gets affected at the state s 36 . When value
abstraction function γexpVm is applied to σ1 , the resultant sequence is σ1v a is given by,
σ1v a = {. . . , s12 , . . . , s13 , . . . , s36 , . . .}
12

belonging to the set P moni t or
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such that the states other than these three important ones in the subsequence are
abstracted.The value abstraction done captures the subsequence where first the
username function is executed (denoted as s 12 ) and then second, the password
function (denoted as s 13 )is executed and third, the executeUpdate function(denoted as
s 36 ) is executed. Similarly we have to do value abstraction to other execution in the set
P moni t or .
We now observe that, all such obtained value abstracted sequences are of two types;
one which have all these three states s 12 , s 13 and s 36 , in the given order once as in σ1 and
another with the first two states s 12 and s 13 , in the given order as in σ2 once and then
none of the three states appear in the sequence ever, to satisfy the given requirement.
Here we note that the smaller sequences got after the value abstraction, define precisely
if a sequence σ ∈ S ω belongs to the set P moni t or with the given requirement. The
commonality among all the elements of the set P moni t or is expressed by H as below.
H = H ∗ • S 12 • H ∗ • S 13 • H ∗ • S 36 • H ω

[

H ∗ • S 12 • H ∗ • S 13 • H ω

(4.12)

where H ∗ and H ω are respectively the finite and infinite subsequences of states
without the states s12 , s13 , and s36 in them. H specifies three states and the order in
which they should appear as in equation 4.12. Here we realize that all the many
possible sequences that could happen distinctly from the execution σ1 is drastically
reduced to only those that abide by the above definition of the set given by H above. We
followed here the formal procedure in [29], to identify the subsequence of states, which
define the monitorable property satisfying the specified requirement. We now identify
the nodes corresponding to these states. They represent three function calls called
username, password and the execute-update in the program. Therefore we deduce
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here that the order of these function calls as the defining13 monitorable
property14 satisfying the given requirement.
Now using Java MOP tool which supports MOP paradigm we generate monitors for
sequence of function calls (username(), password(), executeUpdate() ) which is the
identified safety property.We specify this property using the logical formalism of
Extended Regular Expression (ERE) as ere:(username password executeUpdate) used as
a plug-in in the tool.The tool then automatically generates monitor for the specified
property and uses AspectJ to integrate it together with the code.

An unsafe execution path
As mentioned earlier, we have an internal error which causes an anomaly during
run-time. There are multiple entries for a particular user in the database. Thus when
this user logs in the corresponding count is incremented at (In our experiment there
were two entries for a particular user.) multiple rows. This leads to an inaccurate count
of the visits of registered users in the database. The execution followed by the program
during the successful log in of this particular user is as follows.
σ3 = (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 ,
s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 )+ , s 41 , s 41 , . . .)
We observe that until the state s 33 appears for the first time, the sequence is safe.
13
Listing all the elements to define a set is called definition by extension, while specifying a property
that decides if an element is a member of this set or not is called defining by intention [54]. Now we infer
that if a σ ∈ S ω has the structure specified by H , and so the order of these function calls, then it belongs to
set P moni t or . That is, order of these function calls, ∀ σ ∈ S ω defines by intention the set P moni t or .
14
The user’s login is facilitated by receiving the username and password strings as inputs from the user.
In our program it is done using two function calls. We want to distinguish here between the variables,
and the program’s statement which operates on them. The login could have also been implemented using
two input statements; one each for receiving the username and password. Then the sequence of interest
would have been the states representing these two input operations in conjunction with the operation
updating of visit count.
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When the next state after s 36 is s 31 already an anomaly is created. But when the next
state is again s 33 , the order of function calls is violated, as the update-visit-count
function is repeating and is not preceded by a successful username and password
function calls. By violating the sequence as in σV a of function calls, The property
defined by H is being violated. Thus, the particular element in prefix pr e f (σ3 ), as given
below,
pr e f (σ3 ) = (s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 13 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 ,
s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 36 }
cannot find a β ∈ S ω , such that this prefix can be concatenated to make an infinite path
of execution belonging to P moni t or satisfying the given requirement.This was duly
demonstrated by our experiment in which monitor raises an alarm during the
execution when s 36 is repeated. The anomaly is caught after four states delay from its
beginning at s 31 .During execution when the specified property is violated the monitor
then triggers the user defined violation handler which in our case is displaying the
statement "MOP: FAIL" or any other user defined statements. The monitor then takes
the specified recovery actions which in our case is to immediately stop the execution of
the program.

4.4.3 The sensor detecting violation of monitorable property due to
external problem
This example is a simplified scenario of registered user accessing his account
information from a system. Here the Java program which enables this feature to the
registered users, accepts three inputs from the user: username, password, file name in
an executable file. The first two are used for user authentication. The file name is used
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to identify the name with which the system stores the user’s account information in a
file. The third input which is given in an executable file, will be written on a text file
inside the system, and then the file corresponding to that file name is to be retrieved
from the secure area of the system and its contents are to be printed out on screen.
Here the user given executable file is created by the user by compiling his own C
program Register.c. He only knows the file name on which his file name is to be written.
But apart from that he does not know what processing will happen afterwards based on
his writing his file name on that file. He is not allowed to directly execute the executable
file he created, but he needs to give it as an input to the Java program which is doing the
authentication and processing. Once he gives the executable file as input, the Java
program using "exec" command, executes this executable file. Here the "OS command
injection" method, which is the second most prominent threat over Internet today is
used to attack the system. Inside the C program Register.c, the user had to open the file
Users.txt in write mode by specifying the command "write". Due to malicious
intentions, user specifies "append". This makes this user’s register name written on the
file Users.txt, in the append mode, that is, it does not erase the previous contents. That
is, who ever, had visited earlier to get his account information, his username is also
retained in the file Users.txt and this malicious user’s file name is also added in the next
line. Thus the Java program processes both the file names and gives out the contents in
the files associated with both the file names. This malicious user was not
"entitled/authorized" to know about the account details of the other user. But he came
to know about it. Thus it breached the confidentiality of the user who visited the system
earlier. This anomaly happens mainly due to the accessing two files associated with
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two file names and outputting their contents, after one successful authentication of a
user.15
As in section 4.4.2, we present below the Java program.
import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.sql.*;
import javax.sql.*;
public class FileRead4 // s 1 .
{static String strLine1, strLine2, strLine3;
public void username()// s 2 .
{System.out.println("Enter USERNAME");// s 3 .
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);// s 4 .
strLine1 = in.nextLine(); // s 5 .
}public void password()// s 6 .
{System.out.println("Enter PASSWORD");// s 7 .
Scanner in = new Scanner(System.in);// s 8 .
strLine2 = in.nextLine();// s 9 .
}public void println(String strLine)// s 10 .
{System.out.println(strLine);// s 11 .
}public static void main(String args[])// s 12 .
{try { FileRead4 fr = new FileRead4();// s 13 .
fr.username();// s 14 .
fr.password();// s 15 .
15

The implementation of example as a Java program was done by my co-author in the paper [] Ramya
Dharam.
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String dbUrl = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/student";// s 16 .
String username = "root";// s 17 .
String password = "PASSWORD";// s 18 .
String dbClass = "com.mysql.jdbc.Driver";// s 19 .
String query1 = "Select count(*) as usercount From personalinfo where username =
’"+strLine1+"’ and password = ’"+strLine2+"’";// s 20 .
Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver");// s 21 .
Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection (dbUrl,username,password);// s 22 .
Statement stmt = con.createStatement();// s 23 .
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(query1);// s 24 .
if(rs.next() == true)// s 25 .
{if(rs.getInt("usercount") >0)// s 26 .
{System.out.println("Place the .exe file of C program in the respective folder and enter
CONFIRM when done");// s 27 .
Scanner in1 = new Scanner(System.in);// s 28 .
String strLine4 = in1.nextLine();// s 29 .
if(strLine4.equals("CONFIRM"))// s 30 .
{Runtime rt1 = Runtime.getRuntime();// s 31 .
Process pr1 = rt1.exec("C:HelloWorld.exe");// s 32 .
Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();// s 33 .
Process pr = rt.exec("C:Print.exe");// s 34 .
BufferedReader input = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(pr.getInputStream()));//
s 35 .
String line = null;// s 36 .
int count =0;// s 37 .
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while((line = input.readLine())!= null)// s 38 .
{System.out.println(line);// s 39 .
FileInputStream fstream = new FileInputStream(line);// s 40 .
DataInputStream in = new DataInputStream(fstream);// s 41 .
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));// s 42 .
String strLine;// s 43 .
while((strLine = br.readLine()) != null)// s 44 .
{fr.println(strLine);// s 45 .
}/*end of while*/// s 46 .
count++;// s 47 .
}/*end of while*/
System.out.println("The number of time println called is " +count);// s 48 .
}/*end if*/
else {System.out.println("Thank You");// s 49 .
} }/*end if*/
else {System.out.println("Authentication Failed");// s 50 .
} }/*end if*/
}/*end of try*/
catch (IOException e){// s 51 .
System.out.println(e.getMessage());// s 52 .
}catch (Exception e){//Catch exception if any// s 53 .
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());// s 54 .
}}/*end of main*/}/*end of class*/

Now we define the set all the nodes obtained above as S, given by
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S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 10 , s 11 , s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 15 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 ,
s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 44 , s 45 , s 46 , s 47 ,
s 48 , s 49 , s 50 , s 51 , s 52 , s 53 , s 54 }
The figure below represents the control flow diagram obtained as mentioned in
section 2. From this graph we obtain the following three paths as described in section 2.

Figure 4.3: Control Flow Graph-2

P at h 1 = (s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27
, s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 10 , s 11 , s 44 , s 45 )+ , s 46 )
This path is obtained when the user enters a valid username and password. This
entry leads the user to a successful login and gets the prompting from the system to
input the file name (which is the name of the file used to store his information in the
system). The user then submits the file name entered correctly in the "write mode",
through the executable file and system prints the user’s account details stored as the
content of that file.
P at h 2 = (s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 ,
s 49 , s 50 )
This path is obtained when the user enters an invalid username/password and his
login attempt gets rejected.
P at h 3 = (s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27
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, s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 47 , s 48 )
This path is obtained when the login attempt is successful but the user gives Reject
instead of Confirm while interacting for getting his account information.
As in section 4.4.2 we create σ1 from P at h 1 such that,
σ1 =
(s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28
, s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 10 , s 11 , s 44 , s 45 )+ , s 46 , s 46 , . . .)
Similarly, we create σ2 and σ3 respectively from P at h 2 and P at h 3 . Now along σ1 we
construct other infinite sequences σ11 , σ12 , σ13 , . . . σ143 by dropping first, second, third,
. . . initial elements respectively as shown below.
σ11 =
(s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 ,
s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , (s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 10 , s 11 , s 44 , s 45 )+ , s 46 , s 46 , . . .)
Here it should be noted that σ143 sequence is an infinite sequence of s 45 , which is
the terminal state in σ1 . Similarly we construct from σ2 the infinite sequences
σ21 , σ22 , σ23 , . . ., from σ3 the sequences σ31 , σ32 , σ33 , . . .. By definition S ω is a set of all
possible infinite sequences of s i ∈ S including the above created infinite sequences of
states.
Sω =
{(s 1 , s 1 , s 1 , s 1 , . . .), σ1 , σ11 , σ12 , σ13 , . . . , σ2 , σ21 , σ22 , σ23 , . . . , σ3 , σ31 , σ32 , σ33 , . . . , (s 54 , s 54 ,
s 54 , s 54 , . . .)}
Now we have to note that, the repetitions get collapsed, so that no two elements are
same in the set S ω , as σ223 and σ327 collapse into σ143 .
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Using the executions got from the paths in graph we construct a set property, P
:P ⊂ S ω , as in equation 4.4.
P = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 }
An observation is made in these elements. After initial subsequence σ[0 . . . i ] in all the
elements in P , there exists an element β ∈ S ω , to make the whole sequence to belong to
the set P . Consider σ1 . Let i = 0. Then the initial subsequence σ[0] is (s 12 ). Then we
have a β ∈ S ω such that β = σ11 , making the concatenated sequence to be a valid
member of P . This essentially means the elements of the sequences which are
members of the set P must be members of set S. As we can easily verify that, we
conclude as per equation 4.7, that the property P is called a safety property P sa f e . That
is,
P sa f e = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 }
Prefix of an execution is an initial subsequence of the execution. Consider σ1 . The
set of all the finite prefixes of σ1 is pr e f ( σ1 ), which is given as
pr e f (σ1 ) = {(s 12 ), (s 12 , s 13 ), (s 12 , s 13 , s 14 ), . . .
(s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 15 , . . . , s 45 ), . . .}
Similarly we obtain the sets of prefixes of all the σs in P sa f e , which are, pr e f (σ2 ) and
pr e f (σ3 ). We define the set pr e f (P sa f e ) to be the set obtained by the union of the sets
pr e f (σ1 ), pr e f (σ2 ) and pr e f (σ3 ).
Thus we have,
pr e f (P sa f e ) = pr e f (σ1 ) ∪ pr e f (σ2 ) ∪ pr e f (σ3 )
That is,
pr e f (P sa f e ) = {(s 12 ), (s 12 , s 13 ), (s 12 , s 13 , s 14 ), . . .}
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Now we prove that the above set S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is Turing recognizable. Here we
would use the proof provided in the previous section which works here as well. Thus we
show here that the set S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is Turing Recognizable. As P sa f e is a safety
property and S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is Turing recognizable, we conclude from equation 4.8,
that the set P sa f e is a monitorable property. Lets denote P sa f e from now onwards as
P moni t or .Thus
P moni t or = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 }
We reiterate that the main goal of monitoring in the present example, is to detect if
there is any inconsistency in printing the contents of the file with the account
information of the registered users. This compels us to be particularly interested in the
states where the user login is facilitated and contents of the file is printed.
The Monitored variables, Vm in this example are Boolean variables user-login and
print-register-file representing respectively the login attempt of user and the printing of
the contents of register file of the authenticated user. These variables do not appear in
the program code as variables. They correspond to the statements in the states in the
execution facilitating the login and corresponding printing of the register file with
user’s information. The Boolean variable user-login takes value 1, when login attempt is
successful. It takes the value 0, when the attempt is unsuccessful. The Boolean variable
print-register-file takes the value 1 when the printing of the content of the register file of
a user is successful. It takes the value 0 otherwise.Thus,
Vm = {user − l og i n, pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e}
The expression exp Vm over monitored variables Vm made to cover the specified
requirement is given below.

100

exp Vm = ((((user − l og i n) ∧ (pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e)) ∨
((user − l og i n) ∧ (pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e)) ∨
((user − l og i n) ∧ (pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e))) ∧
(((user − l og i n) ∧
(pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e)(pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e)+ ) ∨
((user − l og i n) ∧ (pr i nt − r eg i st er − f i l e))))
The above expression is a conjunction of two expressions. The first expression consists
of what should happen and the second consists of negation of what should not happen.
The first expression has two parts connected by disjunctions; first one indicates a
successful login and a successful printing of a register file content, the second indicate
a failure of both and the third indicate the successful login of the user but a failure of
printing the information in the file16 . The second expression has two parts; first
indicate a printing of contents of multiple files preceded by a single successful login
and the second indicates printing of a file’s content when the login attempt fails.
This motivates to monitor the subsequence of states which affect the variables Vm .
Now we apply the value abstraction over the sequences in the set P moni t or using the
above expression. We note that, the variable user-login is operated on/ gets effected
during the subsequence between states s 14 and s 15 . The variable print-register-file is
operated on/gets affected at the state s 44 . When value abstraction function γexpVm is
applied to σ1 , the resultant sequence is σ1v a is given by,
σ1v a = {. . . , s14 , . . . , s15 , . . . , s44 , . . .}
such that the states other than these three important ones in the subsequence are
16

This would be caused if the user decides after successful login to reject instead of confirming to get
the information printed.

101

abstracted.The value abstraction done captures the subsequence where first the
username function is executed (denoted as s 14 ) and then second, the password
function (denoted as s 15 )is executed and third, the print-register-file function(denoted
as s 42 ) is executed. Similarly we have to do value abstraction to other executions in the
set P moni t or .
We now observe that, all such obtained value abstracted sequences are of two types;
one which have all these three states s 14 , s 15 and s 42 , in the given order once as in σ1
and σ4 , and another with the first two states s 14 and s 15 , in the given order as in σ2
andσ3 once and then none of the three states appear in the sequence ever. Here we
note that the smaller sequences got after the value abstraction, define precisely if a
sequence σ ∈ S ω belongs to the set P moni t or . The commonality among all the elements
of the set P moni t or is expressed by H as below.
H = H ∗ • S 14 • H ∗ • S 15 • H ∗ • S 44 • H ω

[

H ∗ • S 14 • H ∗ • S 15 • H ω

(4.13)

where H ∗ and H ω are respectively the finite and infinite subsequences of states
without the states s14 , s15 , and s44 in them.
We followed here the formal procedure in [29], to identify the subsequence of states,
which define the monitorable property satisfying the specified requirement. H here
specifies three states and the order in which they should appear as in equation 4.13. We
now identify the nodes corresponding to these states. They represent three function
calls called username, password and the println in the program. Therefore we deduce
here that the order of these function calls as the defining monitorable property
satisfying the specified requirement.
As earlier, we specify the order of calling the
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functions(username(),password(),println()) by ERE as ere:(username password println)
in JavaMop to build the monitor.

An unsafe execution path
As mentioned earlier, we have an external problem, created by a malicious user’s
input, which causes an anomaly during run-time. During the execution of the file
provided by him, the program instead of opening the file in the "write" mode, will open
in the "append" mode and retains the file name entered by the user who logged in
before this malicious user. Thus when the program gets the register file’s name to print
the content , it will get two files names and prints the contents of both. Thus the
malicious user got to know about the information about another user, to which he was
not entitled, thus breached the security by violating the confidentiality of that user. The
execution path followed by the program during the successful log in of this particular
malicious user and acting upon his malicious input is as follows. σ4 =
(s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 , s 27 , s 28 , s 29 ,
s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 44 , s 10 , s 11 , s 45 , s 46 , s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 ,
s 43 , s 44 , s 10 , s 11 , s 45 , s 46 , . . .)
We observe that until the state s 45 appears for the first time, the sequence is safe.
When the next state is again s 38 leading to the loop repeating of the state s 44 , the order
of function calls is violated, as the print-register-file function is repeating and is not
preceded by a successful username and password function calls. By violating the
sequence as in σV a of function calls, The property defined by H is being violated. Thus,
the particular element in prefix pr e f (σ4 ), as given below,
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pr e f (σ4 ) =
(s 12 , s 13 , s 14 , s 2 , s 3 , s 5 , s 15 , s 6 , s 7 , s 8 , s 9 , s 16 , s 17 , s 18 , s 19 , s 20 , s 21 , s 22 , s 23 , s 24 , s 25 , s 26 ,
s 27 , s 28 , s 29 , s 30 , s 31 , s 32 , s 33 , s 34 , s 35 , s 36 , s 37 , s 38 , s 39 , s 40 , s 41 , s 42 , s 43 , s 44 , s 10 , s 11 , s 45 , s 46 , s 38 )
cannot find a β ∈ S ω , such that this prefix can be concatenated to make an infinite
path of execution belonging to P moni t or . But the earliest we could detect the anomaly
was when the printing happened at s 44 , which was six states later than when the
anomaly started. When s 44 is repeated as in previous example the monitor detects the
violation and displays the message.
Based on these works a monitor was constructed to detect SQL injection attack at
[12]. The traditional monitors like process monitor on Windows, which can observe a
lot of processes, could also be used if they are configured to do detection a specific
violation of a requirement property as described above. Similarly on GNU systems
there is Top, Htop, Nmon, Glances, Saider, which could be similarly configured.

4.5 Actuators
The actuators are the devices or processes which are able to execute actions to
respond to the security situation to interact with the suspicious user to reduce the
eventual damages. The main features of the actuators are as follows.

1. The different parameters whose values can be altered in the system, while
responding to a security situation. This decides the set of actions for the
administrator / security system.

2. The least count of the values of parameters which can be altered in a security
situation to affect the data and processes. This gives the precision of the actuator.
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3. The programability of the actuators which decides the action selection and
execution, when the actuators have to respond directly based on the sensor out
put. This decides how the security framework will take obvious/ emergency
actions.
4. The delay in choosing and executing actions for the obvious situation with
sufficient information. This decides the response delay in the Case 1 situation of
the security situation as explained in Section 4.10.
5. The communication delay between the GIDA control unit and actuators, which
decides how fast an action can be executed from the centralized control.
6. The co-ordination with which different actuators can be made to execute a series
of actions. This decides how complex and involved responses can be part of
game’s strategic actions.
7. The computational overhead of the actuators over the functioning of the Target
System.

4.6 Control Unit
This block controls and co-ordinates the defense/ security activity of GIDA. It gets
its inputs about the observed anomalies from the sensors in the Sensors & Actuators
block and submits it to KMS and gets the plan of action as per a game model as the
counter measure. It then uses the look-up table to send directions for such actions to
be performed by the actuators in the Sensors & Actuators block.
This unit, as shown in Figure 4.4 consists of mainly three sub blocks. A
GIDA-Control-Agent, as shown in Figure 4.5, and the two other blocks with look-up
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Figure 4.4: GIDA Control Unit
tables for translating the two inputs into two outputs. The first one is a look-up table
mapping inputs of observation 17 of anomaly/anomalies from the sensors to the inputs
to be submitted to KMS18 . The second one is a look-up table mapping the output of the
KMS which is an action-plan based on a game model, to the the action commands to
be given to the actuators in the Actuators block.
The control agent box has four constituents as shown below.

Figure 4.5: GIDA Control Agent

The main features of the control unit are as follows.
1. The number of sensors that can communicate with the control unit. This decides
the number of inputs and thus the amount and kinds of information possible to
get about the current security situation.
17

These observations collected by the sensors must be useful for the Attack Identification System for
analysis. So, GIDA Control Unit will have to feed it in appropriate way.
18
With the maturing of the model, the KMS can be designed to take the inputs which are as closer to the
sensor inputs.
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2. The number of actuators which can communicate and execute the actions
directed from the control unit. This decides the action set of the administrator.

3. The communication system which translates the input from the sensors to the
knowledge management system (KMS), and from KMS to actuators.

4. The communication delay in the communication between control unit and the
KMS.

5. The configuration, that is, if the control unit is implemented in a central or
distributed manner.

4.7 Knowledge Management System(KMS)
The KMS stores the information about the system and its past security related
situations and processes the information about the current situation from the inputs of
the sensors to formulate the response. The important features of KMS are as follows.

1. The completeness of the information of previous relevant attacks.

2. The precision and correctness of resolution and mapping of attack components
to the assets, attacks, and game model components.

3. The appropriate mapping of the game models with the attacks and effectiveness
of the prescribed preferred response.

4. The computational overload of the KMS on the target system’s performance.

5. The effectiveness of KMS to update it with information about newer attacks from
recent situations and the external repositories and relevant game models.
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The KMS in general has two parts, attack identification system called IRS [70] and
the response formulation part with the game model repository and the game model
selection system based on the taxonomy called ADAPT [69].

4.7.1 Attack Identification System
Attack identification system is called IRS. It has AVOIDIT, ADAPT and the
intelligence that does the job is called IRS as a whole. And IRS uses Attack Graphs.
The process of identifying an attacks has many challenges. One of the main
challenge is to acquire the knowledge of previous attacks and arrange it in a way to be
able to use it effectively to identifying an ongoing one from its symptoms. Many of
these challenges were addressed in the collaborative works at [70, 69]. Identifying the
the attack or set of attacks that are most possibly relevant to the present security
situation from the information got by the sensors and the knowledge repository about
the past system experience is important. Our approach use the attack graphs to achieve
this. This is an ongoing work [64], and we present here the state of the art in the use of
attack graphs in security systems. Today, most of the computational systems are
becoming more complex and engage their respective environments. Since the
environments are neither fully controllable nor predictable, this engagement exposes
the system behavior into non-deterministic spaces. This is true as much of the simple
embedded systems deployed in difficult environments as any complex system
providing services over the Internet. These systems can be modeled to be in a different
state depending on the values of their defining variables at each instant. An
execution/run is a sequence of such states. The execution of the system leading to
undesired state with harmful results is referred to as a failure scenario. A failure
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scenario can be defined as a sequence that violates some correctness property defined
over the system. The set of all possible failure scenarios is called a failure scenario
graph or scenario graph of a system[65]. If the cause of the failure is not a benign
internal fault of the system but a malicious action of an attacker, then such a scenario
graph is called an attack graph. Each path in the attack graph leads to an undesirable
state, such as one representing an intruder gaining administrator access of a file server.
Initially this was to be drawn by the red team manually, which is impractical for
systems with more states. Currently, there are tools to generate them with the inputs
from the system and its environment.
As computational systems, simple and complex, are becoming more engaged with
their environments, the system dynamics are invariably entering non-deterministic
spaces. The modeling of the systems also have to account for the uncertainties and the
need for the continuity of operations faced by the system [78]. The real time response
strategy is essential to reducing the possibility of down time. Thus, the models have to
be effective in detecting and patching the built-in security vulnerabilities in design, as
well as provide the bolt-on security during runtime to design runtime monitors and
actuators.
Lipmann and Inglos [33] presented a survey on attack graphs eight years ago,
wherein they found most of the attempts for using attack graphs were not scalable and
have many limitations. The systems reviewed were not able to consider more than 20
nodes and could not be of practical interest. The automated attack graph generation
and visualization were not yet advanced. There has been much progress and many of
the limitations pointed out in [33] have been overcome.
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Utility of Attack Graphs
The complexity of computational systems are managed by creating models with
various degrees of detail and ensuring the desired properties of those models. The
interesting behaviors generated by the models are analyzed to detect problems and
locate associated fixes. Thus, as systems evolve so do their modeling and analyses. In
this work, we are interested in the modeling which leads to attack graphs. Let us
identify the premise of such modeling.
For illustration purposes, we provide an intuitive example of a system and its attack
graph. There is machine 0, machine 1, and machine 2, which contains a user’s work
station, a web server, and a database server, respectively. The firewall allows http and
ssh requests from machine 0 across to machine 1. During the normal operation, the
user makes a http request to server 1, which goes through the firewall. The server 1
accesses database server running on server 2, to retrieve the required data and
communicates back to machine 0 through http. If the user attempts to access machine
2 directly, then the firewall blocks the communication. This holds true if there is a
request such as an ssh request from machine 0 to machine 2, then it is considered an
anomalous behavior which is blocked by the firewall. Moreover, the database on server
2 would have private data of users other than the one at machine 0. Instead a
command injection attack is successfully launched on server 1 to compromise it. Then
with the help of a compromised shell on machine 1, a SQL injection attack is launched
on the database at machine 2. This being successful the restricted data is siphoned to
server 1, and then to machine 0. This scenario is depicted with the attack graph in the
figures 4.6 and 4.7.
110

This representation is to provide the reader with a logical aspect of an attack. The
probability and cost/weight associated with each transition / edge between the states /
vertices could be added. The belief / trust factor can be accounted and updated with
each transition. Similarly, many other pieces of information can be added to the attack
graph.

Figure 4.6: Attack Graph Example: System

Figure 4.7: Attack Graph Example: Graph

Theoretical Foundations
The complex systems operating in the Internet with multiple threats cannot
possibly fix each of their security vulnerabilities. Thus, the systems and their behavior
are modeled such that the important correctness properties can be prioritized. Idika
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[26] proposed the characterization of the attack graph-based security metrics to
improve hardening with given budget constraints. Therefore, the limited resources
allotted for security must be appropriately expended to locate and patch vulnerabilities
to avoid violating the high priority properties. The modeling needs to facilitate a
natural representation of infinite runs, as most systems, such as operating systems and
servers operating on the Internet run continuously. In such systems, a successful
exploitation of vulnerabilities resulting in a property violation may lead to an
undesirable state. A successful attack will lead the system to infinitely repeating
undesired states. This is logically expressed using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), while
systemically modeled by non-deterministic Büchi automaton or its derivative, a type of
ω-automaton which is an NFA taking inputs of infinite strings [65]. The power of
modeling a system which generates, analyzes, and produces recommendation
strategies for security measures and interactions with the adverse environment, lies in
effectiveness of the finite automata it is built upon. During our survey we came across
the non-deterministic Büchi automaton[65] for modeling systems to generate their
respective attack graphs. For review purposes, we present the background definition of
the non-deterministic Büchi automaton. A non-deterministic Büchi automaton is a
ω-automaton defined as a 5-tuple A = (Q, σ, 4,Q 0 , Acc) where,
• Q is a finite set of states of A.
• σ is a finite set of symbols called alphabet of A.
• 4 is the transition function: Q × σ → P(Q), where P(Q) is the powerset of Q.
• Q 0 is a subset of Q, called the set of initial states.
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• Acc is the acceptance condition, a subset of Q ω 19 .

The run is defined by any infinite sequences
ρ = (q 0 , q 1 , q 2 , . . .) such that,
• q0 ∈ Q 0 ,
• q 1 ∈ 4(q 0 , a 1 ), where a 1 is the first element in the input string,
• q i ∈ 4(q i − 1, a i ), ∀i with 0 ≤ i .
The input is accepted only if at least one of the possible runs belong to the acceptance
condition Acc. In the expressiveness of Acc lies the power of the Büchi automaton to
model the attack graphs. The violations of the correctness properties can be specified
with Acc, and thus the systems are modeled to generate the attack graphs. Either
directly the above automaton or a variation of it is used to build the different attack
graph , generation and analysis systems as we explore throughout this work.

Practical Motivation
There are mainly two practical objectives for the modeling. The first is the effective
management of inputs and outputs of the attack graphs. The system parameters being
the inputs, must be effectively represented in the model resulting in the graph.The
analyses of the model for different security properties, detecting violations should find
the effective responses, as outputs. The second is the ability to generate these graphs
autonomously and efficiently with scalability for larger systems. There has been many
attempts to achieve these objectives with various degrees of success. The handling of
19

Since the runs are infinite sequences, the infinite set of infinite sequences of states in Q, denoted by
Q , will have the subset of some infinite sequences that satisfy the acceptance condition.
ω
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the state-space explosion while generating the graph, analyzing the graphs for security
properties and their violations, the precision of evaluating the exact path efficiently,
making practically implementable recommendation to mitigate the attacks are the
main challenges that provide the practical motivation. The factors that distinguish
each of the efforts to achieve these objectives are:

1. What parameters of the system are used to construct the attack graph?

2. What type of graph is constructed (graphs, trees, nets and non-determinism
involved, ...) and what formal models they are based on?

3. How are the graphs generated?

4. What efforts (methods and tools used) are done for visualization?

5. What are the properties that can be analyzed?

6. What recommendations are obtained from the graph to secure the system?
and

7. What methods were used to evaluate the work?

We study each of the considered works in the light of the aforementioned questions.

State of Art
In this section, we present a general summary, identify the main contribution and
how they address the seven questions we formulated in section 4.7.1.Based on the
exhaustive study at [58] We present what are the capabilities, possible applications and
challenges ahead for the use of attack graphs in security systems. Based on the
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non-deterministic Büchi automaton, attack graphs are generated to model the
continuously executing systems, as the violation of security properties represented in
the linear temporal logic over the network. Using Hidden Markov Models the graph
modeling is made to computationally capture the probability of attacks. Technology is
mature to both incrementally learn from the system and dynamically generate the
attack graphs up to 1000s of nodes. The generation of and representation in attack
graphs can be simulated effectively with tools such as MulVal, as conducted in [47],
[55], [26]. Effective methods are devised to either circumvent or accommodate the
increasing state space complexity. Visualization tools, such as NAVIGATOR, provide
sufficient capabilities to represent and visualize a network topology. The
recommendations are provided based mostly with static analysis. In that case its the
budget that decides the measures that serve the preserving the higher priority security
properties. During the dynamic analysis the recommendations are based on the
amount of information gathered and processed until the analysis started, as in [77].
Usually its the identification of the attack path towards an attacker’s goal and the
recommendation of the measure to thwart that effort with qualified results.These
results are summarized in the table 4.1.

4.7.2 Application
As an example, let us consider a website that contains numerous validation
vulnerabilities. This leads to a sql injection attack (SQLIA) where the attacker intends to
gain unauthorized access to information within a database. The attacker intends to
maximize chances of success by probing the website containing server information
with known vulnerabilities to unpatched database servers. The SQL injection attack is
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Table 4.1: State of the Art
Prominent Works
Models/Methods Non-deterministic Buchi Automaton, Stream
Automaton, Omega languages, Linear Temporal Logic.
Parameters Represented
Vulnerabilities on hosts, Network topology
information, Cost of transitions, Transition Probability, Quantified attacker rewards, Damage/Compromise network states.
Bayesian learning is used to obtain information of network and hosts.
Automatic Graph Genera- Tools (NetSpa, MulVal , NAVIGATOR, BRITE,
tion
GT-ITM, GARNET). Graphs up to 1000s of
nodes. Directed Graphs with and without cycles are generated.
Properties Analyzed
Properties captured in LTL of attack paths.
Dynamic analysis provides a real time evaluation of network.
Violations Detected
Network paths leading to exploits of individual host, break down of network paths.
Visualization
Tools(NAVIGATOR,
GARNET,
NetSpa),
Methodology (Separating host-vulnerability
info and network-topology-info in the graph,
ranking of nodes of graph).
Recommendations derived
Least expensive and minimum number of
cuts to break the attack paths. Identification of the most vulnerable and most affective
hosts in the network to secure.
Computational Complexity
Min cost SAT solving (MCSS) is used to calculate critical paths. Either with randomization
like Monte Carlo methods or not, the analysis
for the graph with N hosts is between O(N 2 ) to
O(N 3 ).
Features
Formal
Used
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normally a multi-staged attack requiring knowledge of specific information for success.
Given our scenario and the above possibilities and capabilities of attack graphs, we can
address security problems due to:

• the attacks with known goals,
• the affected topology of the network due to attack grows at a rate less than N 3 for
a N host network and should be contained with in 1000s of nodes, and

• the attack exploited by the known vulnerabilities.

4.7.3 Challenges
There are still some important challenges in making the use of these attack graphs
in the security systems effective in addressing the present day attacks.

• optimum cost effective security measure with imperfect information about the
network, as in the modern day, many nodes will keep joining and going out of
network constantly,

• generation of useful domain model from network topology,

• effective attack taxonomy for the attack identification which can be updated so
that only the differential changes in the present has to be learned and the rest of
the information can be accessed efficiently,

• an integrated security system.

These limitations restrict the security systems from effectively addressing the attacks
launched through distributed nodes in a network with a dynamic topology.
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The changing topology and the dynamic nature of the attacks are the current
challenges. It has to be used in conjunction with other complimentary methodologies
like dynamic response formulation based on game theory, minimizing the real time
learning, to get a system powerful enough to be of practical interest. Alternatives to
attack graphs are suggested in [25]. More creative metrics are necessary to enhance the
defender’s ability to compare various attack graphs, as described in Idika [26]. We
believe this work provides a foundation for delineating the continued challenges in the
realm of attack graph modeling, generation, visualization and analysis to play an
effective role in the defense against the evolving real world attacks. We devise
algorithms in [64] for effective generation, traversal and update of the attack graphs.
The attack graphs take the input of a set of anomalies and give the output of probability
distribution over the set of probable attacks going on. We show a preliminary
implementation in the issue resolution system built as a module of KMS.

4.7.4 Game Model Repository
The game model repository consists of the specialized game models, which are
derived from the generic game model to address particular security situations
effectively. The specialized game models consists of the different states defined by the
consideration of the parameters involved in the particular situation. The action set is
defined by the appropriate actions available in the situation. The game models
consider the reach of repercussions the actions to define the discount factor, β and the
threshold in the games considered. The exact nature of the situations would ideally
require a corresponding transition and reward / utility functions. But for the initial
approach, a discrete set of transition and reward / utility functions would be useful to
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quantify the situations into appropriate games. The details of the game model
components also has to be appropriately populated with the correct map to the set of
games.
As an initial implementation of the interface for the game model repository the
integrated KMS is built. A screen-shot of the game model repository’s control panel
looks as Figures 4.8 and 4.9.

Figure 4.8: Interface to Game Model Repository

Figure 4.9: Interface to a Game Model

The further development of the repository is planned as future work.
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4.8 Honeypot
The Honeypot is a subsystem which consists of a computer or a set of
computational systems to serve three purposes.

1. To create an illusion for a suspicious user/processes of the target system

2. To be well instrumented during the development so that each of the operation of
the suspicious user/ processes can be registered carefully for dynamic forensic
analysis

3. To be able to change the user experience, by having a dynamic framework to lead
the interaction for better and faster acquisition of information

Attempts to apply game theoretic ideas to construct the Honeypots have been made
[75, 76]. With the premise of game theory for the whole interaction, the interaction in
the honeypot will be a sub-game. But the special need for an incomplete information
game distinguishes that game. Based on the line of enquiry in Section 3.10, the further
development is planned as future work.

4.9 Online Knowledge Base
The online knowledge base is an abstraction of the external resources which has
information about security situations. This includes sources like

• National Vulnerability Database

• cvedetails.com

• opensecurityfoundation.org
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• corporate sources like rapid7.com

• product specific private commercial resources from AVG, McAffe, Symantec, etc.
...

• and others . . ..

The nature of the data, information and knowledge acquired from these sources
include

• common vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE) information

• recommended methods to prevent, detect, identify, mitigate,defend against and
recover from different vulnerability exploits,

• latest information about new attacks

• and others . . ..

like the description of attacks, the set of vulnerabilities targeted by particular attacks,
the recommended mitigation mechanisms, etc.
As a best practice, a routine update from each of the relevant external sources to
improve the KMS is mandatory. This will enable to be ready with the best possible
knowledge to defend, when there is a security situation.

4.10 Organization
A general flow of events in the architecture is shown in Figure 4.10.
The following use cases are considered to address the security problems.
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Figure 4.10: Security Event Flow
1. When there is an anomaly detected, which is sufficiently informative and has a
very obvious preferred response, then the actuator would directly deliver that
response.
For example, if a user is trying to flood too much traffic through a file server so
that the server is being crashed, then suspending that particular user’s requests
for an interval is an obvious response to keep the services to others running.
In this case, the output from the sensors directly stimulate an action from the
actuators, which in many cases will be a single integrated device.

2. When there is an anomaly detected, which is sufficiently informative and has a
very obvious preferred response, which has to be executed by a device not directly
connected with the sensor, the output of sensors is sent to the GIDA control unit.
The control unit then directs the appropriate actuator to execute the response.
In this case, the output from the sensors directly goes to the GIDA control unit, and
a control signal from the GIDA control unit is sent to the appropriate actuator to
execute a response.
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3. When there is an anomaly detected, which is sufficiently informative but
complex, it is not possible to discern the response from that information alone.
Then the output from the sensors goes to the GIDA control unit. Since GIDA
control unit is also not certain of the preferred response, the information from
the sensors is sent to the KMS. In KMS, the information is analyzed by the IRS,
the intelligence to analyze the information about the anomalies, to detect which
assets are under risk and what kinds of threats may be lurking. This leads to
formulate a parameter called attack component. This attack component is used
to for three things.

(a) Attack component is used to predict which attack/ set of attacks may be
going on.
(b) Attack component is used to formulate another parameter called Game
Model Component.
(c) The game model component is used to identify the appropriate game
model/ set of game models that can be invoked to play a game to get more
information to identify and respond to the situation. The game model
component quantifies what are the system parameters which are being
affected by the attack component, and which game model/ set of game
models consider those system parameters in their games.

If there is a game model that is selected from the attack component via a game
model component, then it will be used to instantiate a game. A game model will
have, the details of all the elements in the 9 tuple described in the Chapter 3, and
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also the preferred strategies for the administrator to devise his response from.
The essence of the multiple game models itself is to have clearly define the
systemic meaning of the elements in the 9 tuple, so that as shown in Figure 3.1,
the exact computer / network administration actions / action sequence must be
prescribed accurately.
Using this premise, the interaction is done with the user, and the situation is
addressed.
In this case, the output from the sensors directly goes to the GIDA control unit.
Then it is translated to be sent to KMS for attack identification and recommending
actions based on preferred strategies of the game model that fits the situation best
using a taxonomy based comparison . Then the GIDA control unit responds by
taking those actions through the actuator to respond to the situation.

4. When there is an anomaly detected, which is not sufficiently informative but
complex, the previous step would result in recommendation of no game model.
Such a situation leads to three inferences.

(a) There is a threat associated with the user with anomalous behavior.
(b) The information got at this point is not sufficient to identify or predict what
is the nature of the situation.
(c) It is unsafe to have the user to continue to operate in the system.

In such a situation the user is led to the honeypot to avoid any further damage to
the system but to keep observing the user to get sufficient information in least
number of steps to identify the user’s real intention and respond to him
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appropriately.
In this case, the output from the sensors directly goes to the GIDA control unit.
Then it is translated to be sent to KMS for attack identification and recommending
actions based on preferred strategies of the game model that fits the situation best.
When the decision from the KMS is to declare the insufficiency of information at
hand and declaring it unsafe to have the user operating on the system, the user is
sent to the Honeypot. Then he is again responded with incomplete information
games to get the sufficient information in least number of steps to respond
decisively to the user.
Based on the previous version of the security architecture, a simulation of the event
flow from the anomaly detection until the evaluation of the response based on the
preferred strategy was done.Both the game models used are very simple. They can be
easily derived from the comprehensive game model presented in the Chapter 3. The
architecture used is also based on an earlier version of the security architecture. That
simple architecture fits as a small special case of the architecture presented in the
Chapter 4. Next section presents the simulation and the results.

4.11 Simulation
As an initial prototype, a simulation was done with the flow of events from the
anomaly detection to attack identification, selection of relevant set of game models,
and selection of the fittest among the set, deploying recommended strategy of the
selected game model, and evaluating the outcomes of the actions selected[2].
The motivation was to delineate the flow of one event triggered process executed
through the functions of the blocks and the operational flow in the security
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Figure 4.11: Simplified Security Architecture: Initial version of the architecture in Section 4.1.

Figure 4.12: DDOS Attack Network Topology
architecture.20
A Distributed Denial of Service DDOS attack, caused by flooding packets from
different computers through a communication channel across points P 1 &P 2 in the
network, was the modeled security problem. The network topology for the considered
20
We did not explicitly engage the blocks of external knowledge bases and honeypot in the example.
That is planned as future work. The experiment was only a numerical simulation.
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attack is shown by Figure 4.12. An anomalous increase in the traffic through a gateway
is taken as the sensor input. This event starts the engagement of the security system.
Considering the input information of the observed rise in the traffic, the attack
components

• The attacker’s average bandwidth consumption of (P 1 − P 2 ):νb
• The ratio of lost users to the total users on average: νn
• Number of attack nodes employed: νc
are identified. With the attack components(the set of system parameters affected by
the observed attack), the corresponding/ related set of game model components (the
aspects of the system which are considered by the game models) are identified. The
sets were taken as identical for simplicity. The set of relevant game models which
correspond to having the game model components identified from the present
situation is selected. Two game models GM1 and GM2, were taken as elements of this
set. The main distinction between the game model can be summarized as:

1. The attacker has free access to practically unlimited computers which he uses to
launch the packet flooding.

2. The attacker incurs a cost for using a computer to launch the packet flooding.

Thus GM1 does consider the cost of using computers in modeling the attacker’s reward,
while GM2 does not. The selection of the most appropriate game model from this set of
game models is done using the Attack-Defense and Performance metric Taxonomy
(ADAPT ) presented in [69], as shown in Figure 4.13. Our assessment gives the game
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model GM1 as the better fit due to higher value of fitness value V a based on relevance,
expressed as a weighted sum of the game model components. The difference of one
missing component in the case GM2 makes the fitness value low. The algorithm used

Figure 4.13: Game Assessment

Figure 4.14: Game Assessment Algorithm

is referred to as Game Assessment Algorithm as shown in 4.14.The administrator has
one action to take. To decide at what value of a flow (number of packets per second)
coming from any computer, the firewall threshold should be set to drop it. If he puts
the threshold too low then he may drop a legitimate user’s flow. If he keeps the
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threshold too high then attacker can comfortably flood the network to attack
successfully.The attacker has to incur an extra cost to use more machines to send
malicious traffic. With more number of computers attacker can send less number of
packets per computer to send enough in total to successfully attack without causing
obviously being stopped due to exceeding the firewall threshold flow. The ratio of
number of users dropped to the total number of users is the reward for the attacker and
also cost (negative reward) for the administrator. This simulation was considered as a
zero-sum game, a simple case of the one considered in the Section 3.1. During the
numerical simulation 21 , our analysis is validated with two games having different
equilibrium points with different actions leading to them for the administrator, as
shown in Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17. Here the main action of the
administrator was to decide at what value of number of packets sent by a particular
node, should administrator start dropping the flow using the firewall. The action
prescribed by the game GM2 leads to the attacker having a greater payoff, which is not
advisable for the security of the target system. The difference between the games GM1
and GM2 in terms of attacker’s payoff is shown in Figure 4.18. Thus we were able to
show the effectiveness of our architecture in addressing security situations.
With the development of security architecture including the game models, the
sensor and the attack identification system we recognized that, most of the system
implementation happens on cloud based system. So, it is important to study formally
the structure of such systems and their security concerns to be able to use our
architecture to secure them. In the next chapter we present the formalization of
21

The MatLab program was written by my co-author in [2], Harkeerat Bedi.
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Figure 4.15: Nash Equilibrium obtained using Game Model 1

Figure 4.16: Nash Equilibrium obtained using Game Model 2
security in the cloud based systems.
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Figure 4.17: Attacker Payoff

Figure 4.18: Potential difference between game models 1 and 2
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Chapter 5

Security in the Cloud Based Systems
In this chapter we present a formal model and a framework of the cloud based
systems (CBS) to formulate such a target system to be tenable to be secured using the
security architecture presented in Chapter 4. The formal modeling of the security of
cloud based systems involve

1. model the system with all its relevant parameters,

2. represent requirement properties,

3. verify the effectiveness of the security measures using model checking,

4. detect violations of the requirement properties,

5. derive precise implementable recommendation,

6. ensure the procedure is scalable.

As the CBS would be distributed in deployment, the traditional instrumentation to
devise the standard run-time monitors as discussed in section 4.4 would be not
feasible. In such circumstances, two measures are required to detect the anomalies.
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1. when direct in-code instrumentation is possible, formulating the requirement
properties based on the minimum instrumentation possible to keep track of the
important parameters,
2. when direct in-code instrumentation is not feasible, the statistical behavior of the
parameters, by sampling the values being passed at some specified intervals,
have to be used to detect anomalies.
To be able to do so, here we present the formal modelings of the security of the CBS.

5.1 Specification Framework
A CBS can be considered as a set of computational entities(including storage), each
considered as a node. The graph we obtain will including the communication path
between these nodes as edges. Each node is associated with data and tasks on it.

5.1.1 Stakeholder’s Computational Space
In this section we present a formal framework of CBSs based on the model in [59].
Here we present a time invariant model of the computational space of the stakeholders.
That is, the stakeholder’s choice of actions at an access area/node, is same irrespective
of when she enters the area/node. Let the CBS involves n, where 0 < n < ∞, different
stakeholders. The i t h , 1 ≤ i ≤ n stake holder h i has an authorized access to a part of the
system. This is referred to as the access space s i A of the stakeholder h i . In each of these
areas, the stakeholder h i can choose to do one action, at a time, out of the clearly
defined set of actions, s i a j corresponding to j t h node. The ordered pair of this access
area and the corresponding set of action is referred to as the activity area. s i α j
= (s i A j , s i a j ). The union of all such sets of actions available at, that is, corresponding to,
each of the m areas/nodes in the access space is referred to as the stakeholder’s action
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space. s i a . s i a =

Sm

s .
j =1 i a j

The union of all nodes/access areas is the access space of the

stake holder h i , that is, s i A =

Sm

s .
j =1 i A j

The union of all the activity areas of the

stakeholder h i , is called the activity space of h i . s i α =

Sm

s .
j =1 i α j

The sequence of all the

activity spaces of the stakeholders is referred to as the activity profile S α of the CBS, as
in S α = (s 1α , s 2α , . . . , s nα ) The security measures each stakeholder has to take must be
able to accomplish with some combination of the legal actions that are available to
him. It may involve one or more actions in tandem to be taken in each access area.
The security measures in the access area s i A j the stakeholder h i has to take be the
set r i A j , such that r i A j ⊆ s i a j . Thus, the security activity a stakeholder does in the access
area s i A j is given by the tuple r i α ,
such that r i α j = (r i A j , r i a j ). Any practical security measure generally involves a
sequence of actions across many activity areas to be effective. And the total security
activity of the stake holder h i is given by r i A , such that r i A =

Sm

r .
j =1 i α j

The sequence of

all the security activity spaces of the stakeholders is referred to as the security activity
profile S α of the cloud, that is, R α = (r 1α , r 2α , . . . , r nα ). A security measure by a
stakeholder is an ’a priori’ plan of security actions at each access area. We distinguish
security measure from the defense measure which happens, as a series of actions, while
defending a system against a malfunction either due to an internal system fault or a
malicious attack. For a given node/access area, the activity profile would be

S α j = (s 1α j , s 2α j , s 3α j , . . . , s nα j ).

(5.1)

More than one stakeholder may have access to the data on a given node. To make the
data secure, the activity profile for that given node must be prioritized, that is, sorted as
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per the privileges. And it must be ensured that each of the stakeholder who will alter
the data must do so only with out negating any stakeholder before him in the sequence.
For notational simplicity let us take the equation 5.1 as the ordered sequence as per the
privileges.

5.1.2 Executable Formal Model
The model of the CBS must have the following features.

1. The model must facilitate expressing concurrent computation in a distributed
system.

2. The components must be able to function as message driven, depending on
asynchronous messaging between them, as in a client server paradigm, the CBS
operate with components providing computational resources as a service to each
other.

3. The model must express precisely the states of the components such that the
analyses for the interesting properties could be made.

4. The properties thus obtained must be sufficient to completely express (account
for) the security of the CBS.
5. The model must be able to precisely express the operations in CBS such that an
analysis can be done using statistical model checker such as PVESTA.

Modularized Actor Model
We here describe the Modularized Actor Model based on [24], of the computational
space which a stakeholder has in a CBSs.The Actor Model is a model of computation
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with "Actors" as the universal primitives. An Actor is a computational entity. It can
respond to a message it receives from other Actors by

1. send messages to other Actors;

2. create new Actors;

3. designate how to handle the next message it receives.

Here we note that each actor will have a state. There is no global state with which the
actors have to synchronize. The sequence of states of each actor forms the execution
associated with that computational entity modeled as an actor. Then the model is
analyzed for properties as described in the section 5.2. Here the modularity comes by
the fact that once a message is sent then it is the responsibility of the receiver. This
asynchronous behavior helps formulate the modularity in the model.The case studies
in the section5.3 provide illustration for the application of the framework and the
analyses of properties.

5.2 Analyses of the model for Properties
We here present the analyses framework for the model described in 5.1.2 for
properties. As given in the section 5.1.1 each stakeholder has a corresponding
computational space in the CBS. Each computational space has many nodes. Each
node has data and tasks associated with it. Each node is modeled as an Actor. Each
node has a state. The sequence of states of each node is an execution. A set of
executions is a property. There will be two types of properties associated with the
executions; liveness and the safety properties. With a conjunction of these two types of
properties we can specify any requirement property for the executions. Thus when the
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requirement property to cover CIA for the node is specified, then it can be taken as the
sufficient condition for the security of the node. The CIA properties specified for the
node can be verified by using the statistical model checker PVESTA . Modeling the CBS
as a Modularized Actor model, following the procedure in [15] facilitates this. We here
want to specify the security as CIA properties. The data at each node is used to keep
track of information through out the CBS. We here take the CBS to be secure if at each
node, CIA properties are preserved. We consider that the access to data (including the
meta-data) would lead to information in that data. And any requirement property that
we want to specify to preserve a specific security concern of the CBS, should be done by
decomposing it in terms of the CIA properties. And we know from [56] that any such
property can be adequately specified as a conjunction of liveness and safety property.

5.2.1 Security as CIA properties
We consider that sufficient condition for the CBS to be secure would be to have CIA
properties preserved at each of the nodes making up the CBS. The nodes considered in
the previous sections are associated with data stored and tasks running on them. The
tasks running on a node can be operating on the data stored on the local node or on
any other node. In either case, the tasks can be considered to be running to alter data
on some node. If that node is not in the computational space of stakeholder (user) we
can be sure that his confidentiality is not compromised through the data being
operated by the tasks. But we clarify that we define information to be related to not
only data but also meta-data and also data related to the configuration of the node, like
its processing platform, etc. Thus ensuring the security of the data and ensuring that
the tasks are taking safe paths will ensure the security of the node. By ensuring the
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security properties of each node, the security of the CBS of the stakeholder is ensured.
When each space of the stakeholder is secure then the whole CBS is secure.

Confidentiality Property
Unauthorized disclosure of information would lead to the violation of the
confidentiality property. The data associated with the node, will have the usual three
actions associated with it. Given that both static data and the programs are considered
data here, the read, write & execute actions would be associated with them. In this case,
given that the order in equation 5.1 is preserved with read action such that the
sequence is ordered as per the privileges of stakeholders on the data, and only those
who have the privilege to be able to access the data should get to read it. That is, this
gives rise to three sequences of stakeholders. First will have access to read, while the
second can only write and third can only execute. With the order in these sequences be
preserved to ensure the stakeholders with only read privileges can read the data, the
confidentiality property is preserved. Thus this property is a set of three sequences of
privileges of data on a given node, which are preserved during the execution of tasks.

Integrity Property
Unauthorized modification of information would lead to the violation of the
integrity property. When this order is preserved during an execution, that is a sequence
of states of the node, which represents many actions over the data on the node, the
integrity of the data is preserved. Given the data and the tasks associated with the node,
we define the state of node. That is s j (nod e) = (s j (d at a), s j (t asks)).
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Availability Property
Unauthorized withholding of information would lead to the violation of the
availability property. The availability property is to ensure, during the execution, if the
privilege order in the above mentioned stipulation is satisfied, the tasks associated with
the users must get executed, that is, the task must be successfully completed, by
accessing the necessary data. Then the availability property is satisfied.

5.2.2 Specification of the CIA Properties as a conjunction of Safety and
Liveness Properties
Formally execution is defined as an infinite sequence of states. By repeating the
terminating state in the paths obtained we construct the infinite sequences
representing the execution. Such an infinite sequence of process states, starting with
an initial state and each successive states s i , 0 < i < ∞ being a valid state, that is
s i ∈ S, 0 ≤ i < ∞, representing an execution is given by σ = (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . .).
It should be noted that the order of the states in the execution need not follow the
subscript order of nodes obtained from the program, as it is only decided by the flow of
execution.Thus all the executions σi , 0 < i < ∞ are obtained. By dropping the initial
elements in the sequence of these executions, many infinite sequences are created
which represent a later part of an execution in the process. That is by dropping an
initial state in the execution above, which may be called σ1 , another σ11 is created, as
given by σ11 = (s 1 , s 2 , . . .). Now the infinite set of all infinite sequences of all
permutations of s i , s i ∈ S (which also contains all the executions and the later parts of
executions like in equation), is denoted by S ω is constructed, as given by
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S ω = {(s 1 , s 1 , s 1 , . . .), (s 2 , s 2 , s 2 , . . . ), . . . ,

σ1 , σ11 , . . . , σ2 , σ3 , . . .}

(5.2)

Property is defined as a set of executions.
P = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , . . .}.
A property P ⊆ S ω is a safety property P sa f e if for every sequence σ ∈ P ,for every
prefix of σ, there exists a sequence β ∈ S ω which when appended will make the
resulting sequence to be a member of the set P . This means in essence that the
sequences σs contain as each element states only from S. The executions belonging to
the safety property are called safe executions. If σ1 , σ2 , σ3 and σ4 are safe executions,
then P sa f e = {σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , σ4 , . . .}.
Prefix of an execution is an initial subsequence of the execution and it represents
the execution of the process from the beginning up to some finite number of states. We
define the set pr e f (σi ) as a set of all the finite prefixes of the execution σi . For example
consider the execution σ1 and the set of all its finite prefixes, denoted as pr e f ( σ1 ),
given by
pr e f (σ1 ) = {(s 0 ), (s 0 , s 1 ), (s 0 , s 1 , s 2 ), . . .} . The union of all the sets of prefixes of each
executions in P sa f e , is given by pr e f (P sa f e ). During the union operation the elements
which are common are collapsed into a single element, as there can not be any
repetition of members in the set. That is, the first element in the sets
pr e f (σ1 ), pr e f (σ2 ), pr e f (σ3 ) and pr e f (σ4 ), which is the finite prefix of length 1 of
σ1 , σ2 , σ3 and σ4 is the same, which is (s 0 ). But during the union there will be only one
element (s 0 ) in pr e f (P sa f e ).Thus we have, pr e f (P sa f e ) = ∪σ∈P sa f e pr e f (σ).
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Safety Properties
The safety properties of the CBS amounts to the runtime properties which ensure
that the system has bolt-on security. A safety property P sa f e is a monitorable property
P moni t or abl e , when S ? /pr e f (P sa f e ) is Turing recognizable. That is after examining a
given execution, if we are able to determine in finite steps, if that execution is not in the
set P sa f e then it is a monitorable property. Thus from the safety property we construct
a monitorable property as given by, P moni t or = {σ1 , σ2 , . . .}. Once the above set,
monitorable property is identified, we have to get a more useful definition of this set to
be able to build a monitor for it.

Liveness Properties
The liveness properties of the CBS amounts to the design properties which ensure
that the system has built-in security. Given a prefix if a sequence certainly land in a
prescribed state then such a set of sequences corresponds to the liveness propertyP l i ve .
Given the properties of CIA at a node, each of these requirement properties can be
completely expressed as a conjunction of a liveness and safety property [56]. That is,
PC I A i = P sa f e i &P l i ve i .

5.2.3 Model Checking
The model the CBS obtained here can be checked using statistical model checker
like PVESTA, the parallelized implementation of VESTA . PVESTA does statistical
verification of properties expressed in many types of logics against probabilistic
real-time models specified as probabilistic rewrite theories in Maude or continuous or
discrete Markov Chains. The logics that are handled are Probabilistic Computational
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Tree Logic (PCTL), Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) or the Quantitative Temporal
Expression language (QuaTEx). PVESTA is implemented in Java. It consists of mainly
two programs. A server program which implements the computing resource being
modeled-checked, to generates the random samples of output by discrete-event
simulations of a given probabilistic model. The client program collects these samples
from the server program and does the statistical verification, by hypothesis testing for
the logic formulas and and confidence interval computations for QuaTEx
expressions.The procedure to check/verify the model would follow along the same
lines as in [40, 15]. In our work here, we only present the framework for the model and
show how to analyze the model for specific security properties but do not present the
verification.

5.3 Application of the Model
The framework here presented can be used to model the CBSs to analyze for the
requirement properties such that, the security breaches would be caught as the
violation of these properties by an execution. The anomalies can be defined to be the
property violations, and thus by ensuring the property to be monitorable, a runtime
monitor can be built to catch the violations.

5.3.1 Security Breaches
In the past year, there have been many instances of security breaches of the CBS.
Considering such total incidents, a list (ordered on the severity of damage), of most
damaging breaches is published [17]. That ordered list contained Data breaches, Data
loss, Account hijacking, Insecure APIs, DoS, Malicious Insiders, Abuse of Cloud Service,
Insufficient due diligence, Shared technology issues.These security violations could be
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formulated as the following Property violations:
• The first two security breaches involve directly the data stored by a stakeholder
being lost for good or being altered in ways it was not supposed to. In both the
cases the data on a node/set of nodes are altered by tasks that violate the Integrity
Property.
• In the account hijacking, we see that all the privileges of the stakeholder is taken
by some other person/entity while the original authority might/might not have
lost his privileges. Thus in case of loosing the privileges by the original
stakeholder, it amounts to the violation of confidentiality property. If the original
stakeholder is not denied of his privileges, then also it would amount to the
violation of availability property.
• The APIs are used by the consumer to manage the provisioning, management,
orchestration and monitoring of the cloud services. The security breaches due to
the insecure APIs have been the fourth biggest cause for the security breach of
CBSs. This can result in the loss of access to services provided by the cloud
service provider. As the upper edifice depends on these APIs, this amounts to the
violation of availability property. 1
• The most prominent type of DoS attack is at the network layer, where many users
share the same channel for transmitting the data to and from the cloud. This kind
of attack can be modeled as shared channel attacker model. The adaptive
selective verification protocol is useful to define the action of the DoS attacker
1

Here the violation of the availability property has to be defined broadly to cover not only the data
associated with the nodes, but also the tasks too. The curtailing of the availability of APIs results in the
reduction of action set of the affected stakeholder.
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doing shared channel attack 2 . The main idea is to keep track of the time interval
between the service request by the client and getting service. This amounts to
violation of Availability Property.

• The sixth highest damage has been due to malicious insiders. CERT [10] defines
this threat 3 . It is similar to the identity theft, as the attacker actually passes
through the authentication while doing the malicious activity. Here the attacker’s
privileges would be that of a cloud service provider’s crew rather than that of a
customer.

• Abuse of Cloud Service, as a security breach highlights our framework’s modeling
strength in its scope of including each of the stakeholder and their activities. This
is concern for the cloud service provider. Given a cloud service, an authorized
user who has some privileges may execute the available actions to achieve a
result which is not legal/ethical/authorized either inside the cloud or beyond the
cloud intending to damage/harm other stakeholders with malicious intentions to
breach any or all of CIA properties.4

• Insufficient due diligence plays a critical role with many businesses which offer
their services using the cloud based services by other CSPs. While doing so, there
have been many security breaches, for the end user. There can be
2

Here we can see that the requirement property is the sequence of states, with states (having time
stamps) indicating client "Requests" & server "Responses"as in [15].
3
A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former employee, contractor, or other
business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information systems.
4
A concrete example would be the compromising the authentication server of the Dropbox [14] on
20,June 2011 for 4 hours while the attackers could access data of other users, breaching confidentiality
property.
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incompatibilities between the contractual obligations between the cloud service
provider and the businesses and that of the businesses and the end user. This has
led to many security breaches. While exposing the confidential data out on cloud,
this has amounted to the violation of the confidentiality property. By breaking
some services and processes from operating correctly violation of availability
property is also caused.
• Shared technology issues CBS built using IaaS, PaaS, SaaS, offered by the
disparate stakeholders can lead to vulnerabilities due to configuration issues. For
example, when a Unix based cloud is used for infrastructure and a Mac OS is
installed on a virtual machine thus obtained, which in turn runs an MS office
over it, there are chances that the technologies may have stability issues. The
distinctions in the file systems can also create problems. Usually these can lead
to both malfunctioning of programs and also data loss, thus amounting to
violations of both integrity and availability properties.

5.3.2 Security Solutions
Many prominent security solutions are offered as products and services to the
cloud customer. These solutions are designed to provide security in the cloud, for the
cloud and from the cloud. The nodes/accesses areas of the customer of CBS are
constantly having data and processes on them. By securing these, that is, in turn, there
is an attempt to provide security. Here are some prominent security solutions offered
commercially.
• Identity & Access Management: These solutions are provided by
companies/services such as SyferLock Technology Corporation, [72], Symplified
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& PingI identity. These services would attempt to reduce the identity theft. Thus
they would be ensuring that confidentiality property is preserved.

• Key Management: This solution is provided by companies/services such as
Securosis, L.L.C. [57]. This ensures the authentication is done with more
reliability.Thus they would be ensuring that confidentiality property is preserved

• Data Encryption: This solution is provided by companies such as TrendMicro Inc
[73]. These solutions would provide processes to ensure unauthorized persons /
programs cannot get the confidential information while the data is being
encrypted using safe encryption techniques. Thus they would be ensuring that
confidentiality property is preserved.

• Network Firewall: This solution is provided by companies such as StilSecure Inc
[71]. This solution offers processes which intervene in the network traffic
between the nodes/ access areas in CBS. They will eventually get to block the
malicious flow in the shared channels that can create DoS attack. Thus they
preserve availability property.

5.4 Model Checking
The works [40] & [15] have attempted to model the CBSs. They concentrate on
modeling CBSs for analyzing the management and to check for the design flaws leading
to security risks respectively. They consider CBS as a model to offer computational
resources as services over networks. For analyses they specify the services of CBSs in
D-KLAIM a dialect of the co-ordination language KLAIM [44] and build the model.
Then they check the model using Maude system [9]. Since this kind of modeling is
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suitable for exact model checking, it can be effective only for small systems. For larger
systems, due to the explosion of states, using the dialects of KLAIM to model and
performing exact model checking, is found to be not scalable. Hence, Actor Model of
Computation [24] is used to model the CBSs and a statistical model checker, PVESTA [1]
is used to verify them. The main idea in their case study of DDOS attack scenario is to
create Adaptive-Selective-Verification wrapper meta objects for the client and server
sides and describe it as modularized actor model in the Maude language and analyze
using PVESTA, the statistical model checker.
We present the formal framework for constructing the executable models of CBS,
useful for analyzing the security properties. The properties of model can be used to
either verify using statistical model checkers or more practically to build run-time
monitors to catch anomalies. We illustrate our framework’s utility by modeling the
prominent security breaches and solutions of last year. It is very crucial to precisely
formulate the security properties that are to be preserved by the CBS, which will be
verified against the model of the CBS. But we observe that building a model for a
complex CBS manually is not feasible. Since we define the CBS as a union of
computational spaces corresponding to stakeholders, such computational spaces are
successfully modeled as Markov Decision Processes. Automating the abstraction for
incrementally generating of models for such systems is established in [4].
Using these procedures developing an executable model of an enterprise size
system to analyze and verify for security properties is an interesting future work. That
would facilitate dealing with attacks like compromises due to cross-virtual machine
attacks and attacks across different software/middleware/hardware entities as the
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model is not limited by component-security based methodologies to secure the CBS.
With such formulations, it becomes feasible to deploy the security architecture
presented in Chapter 4 to even address a dynamic and involved attempts to breach the
security.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion
The problem of securing important computational systems exposed to the Internet
with systems that can be used to launch attacks is both complex and important. There
have been many particular security problems and attacks which have been addressed
and effectively mitigated using game theoretic approaches. The success of these
attempts inspired the work presented in this dissertation, to attempt to build a generic
security system based on the game theoretic solutions. The design of the generic game
model, establishing its basic structure and computational procedures to model the
interaction is the primary step.
Based on that, designing the security architecture is the next step. The soundness of
the design was verified with numerical simulations. Initial implementation of some of
the parts of architecture is done. With these developments, the system is almost ready
to address some particular real life attacks. The development or rather co-ordination of
the prevalent run-time monitors and actuators are being done to address a wider range
of and hopefully all of present day security situations.
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6.1 Summary
The work presented here is distributed in the ongoing project to apply game theory
to cyber security. Many of the contributions are in the modeling different aspects used
in designing the security architecture. Simulations were conducted to verify the
soundness of the design and gear towards system development. There have also been
some initial system development. We summarize the highlights of the work as follows:

1. Game Model and a Security Game: A simplified game model with extensions to
handle imperfect information is constructed. A network security game handling
generic security situations was designed. Extensive numerical simulations were
done to study the behavior of the game which validated our analysis.

2. Framework to interact with suspicious user:A framework for the efficient
investigation of a suspicious user in honeypot was designed. The boundary
condition for user classification is established.

3. Modeling n-player co-operative security games:The boundary condition for
players to co-operate and the administrator to devise a common response for a
group of users is established.

4. Security system architecture. Design, Analysis and Initial Implementation of
many components:The architecture and organization of the security system is
designed. The initial implementation of many of the components was done.
Novel methodology for sensors and attack identification were presented.

5. Security modeling of the cloud based systems:A formal model of the cloud
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based systems for the analysis of security properties was designed. Based on the
model, the procedure to detect violation of requirement properties is designed.
This framework makes the security systems based on the architecture presented
here, to work effectively with the cloud based systems.

6.2 Publications
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3. Eman Aldhahri, Vivek Shandilya, Sajjan Shiva.On Optimal Crowdsourcing. under
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4. Vivek Shandilya, Sajjan Shiva.A Security Architecture for the Cloud Based Systems.
under review.

5. Vivek Shandilya, Sajjan Shiva.A Network Security Game Model. under review.

6. Vivek Shandilya, Chris Simmons, Sajjan Shiva. Use of Attack Graphs in Security
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151
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14. S. Roy, C. Ellis, S. Shiva, D. Dasgupta, V. Shandilya, Q. Wu. A survey of game theory
as applied to network security. The 43rd Hawaii International Conference on
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The complete design of the security architecture with all the micro details of protocols
for operations of all the components is our ongoing project. Along with designing the
architecture and the organization, the basic development of components is only
partially complete. The novel methodologies and technologies are to be devised to
make use of the architecture to effectively integrate the traditional and the emerging
sensors and actuators. In each of these areas the work presented here has sprouted
many new challenges as summarized below, along with my ongoing efforts.

6.3 Modeling Security Games with n-Players
Modeling different behaviors of players is of primary importance. Given that,
finding a unified theory to establish the behavioral patterns in a rational way and
optimal solutions for each pattern is the primary goal. When there are n-players with
conflicting and mutually unknown motivations operating in stochastic systems,
establishing connections between the different objectives of optimization and security
is a continuation of this work. Formalizing the theory of security in a more
fundamental way is important in this regard.

6.4 Algorithms and Computational Complexity
Defining useful equilibria and developing efficient algorithms to compute them
with general-sum rewards, imperfect and incomplete information for stochastic
conditions is useful in increasing the applicability of game theory. Exploring for more
useful notions of equilibria as we started out here, has practical utility.
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6.5 Implementation and Deployment
In the technology side, formulating the low level protocols for the operation and
communication of the subsystems in the architecture is the next step. This would lead
to the identification of the common minimum implementation of subsystems to make
the whole system functional. Testing against the real life attacks would be the logical
step to make the architecture and the resulting system mature.

6.6 Security Games in CBS
With elaborate formulations, a more rigorous analytic framework is needed.
Implementing the security system on disparate configurations of the CBS shall be a
very instructive, productive and promising endeavor.
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Appendix A
A.1 Game at ξ1
When the admin uses "Trap", he is executing the aggressive expensive action. If the
user is not attacking then it is a loss. If he is an attacker who has not launched attack
then two things can happen. The attacker is rendered harmless by being taken out of
the main system. On the other hand the attacker if has a honeypot detection ability,
may discern about the admin’s move and start behaving like a good user and may never
launch the attack at all. The user when launches an attack, its an expensive action to
attempt/execute. If the admin, chooses to defend, then the attack is least likely to
succeed. If he chooses to signout or trap, then also the attacker’s impact may be
reduced. But the chances of attack succeeding is higher than with the action defend.
On the other hand trap and defend are expensive actions to attempt/execute, while
signout may or may not succeed. The promote and normal operation will cause heavy
damage and considerable damage respectively.

A.2 Example
This can be illustrated with an example. In the game in section 3.6, an attacker
trying to attack in ξ1 may be affecting the eventual success of his attacking plans by
revealing his attacking intention such that if he does not succeed with the present
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attempt, may later affect the reaction of the admin to promote to ξ2 if he chooses α112 .
Thus information revealed to the other player about one’s intention can affect the
potential of the all next actions to propel the state transitions. Even if by chance, while
the player is attacking, the game lands in the ξ2 instead of ξ3 , he will now be under
serious gaze of administrator. With this premise, logging out of the system may be
better off with sign-out action, than to be stuck in Honeypot by the administrator. Thus
the desirability of landing in ξ2 after an attack action α113 may not be same as just
landing with α112 .

A.3 Generalized Imperfect Information Factor
The model for 2-state game in [67] with the following extension can be used to
calculate Nash equilibrium for an N -state game with N < ∞. From [16] we follow that
the stochasticity of the game provides us with a probability P m (i , j ) with which the
state ξ j can occur from ξi in m t h iteration. The occurrence ratios r 1 , r 2 , r 3 & r 4
corresponding to the states ξ1 , ξ2 , ξ3 & ξ4 are given by r i = limm→∞ P (1,i )+P
,1 ≤ i ≤ N with

PN

i =1 r i

2

(1,i )+...+P m (1,i )
m

= 1, and N =4 for the game in section 3.6. But the perceived

P
k
occurrence ratios are different and is given by r i0 = N
j =1 p j ∗ r j . We note that the
i

0

apparent strategy is different than the truly executing strategy. We have πk = I I F ∗ πk ,
where I I F is called the Imperfect Information Factor. I I F is defined as a matrix with
entries z i j with i rows and j columns, with z i j =

p kj ∗r j
i

r i0

. This gives the generalized I I F

for N states. For the game in section 3.6 with 5 states we get,
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²-Neighborhood Optimal Strategy Profile

The problem of finding the optimal exact Nash Equilibrium efficiently in the
general case is challenging. Many progressive efforts are reported as discussed in
section 5.4. We plan to progress on those results in our future work. We here calculate
an ²-Approximate Equilibrium(AE) for an example of the stochastic game presented in
3.6. Traditionally, ²-AE in a stochastic game is defined as the strategy profile, where no
player can improve his expected average reward more than ² by unilateral strategy
deviation.We introduce another variation ²-Neighborhood Optimal Strategy Profile
(²-NOSP)|0 ≤ ² < 1 here.
The traditional definition of the ²-ANE is dependent on the motivation being not
greater than ² to deviate from the prescribed strategy profile for each of the players.
When the game is stochastic, reward is valued at the average of rewards got by the
execution of the game with the same strategy profile some number of times. We
propose here a variation here due to two reasons.

1. Since the distribution of the rewards some times was bi-modal, the average may
not be a comprehensive measure of the distribution.
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2. There is a non-trivial probability of getting a higher reward for a player with a
strategy with lower average reward than one with higher average reward,
depending on their standard deviations.

Without assuming any distribution for the rewards over multiple game runs for a
strategy profile, we calculate the ²-NOSP νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πki ,...,πK
∗)

² ≥ (νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πk∗ ,...,πK
∗ )max

σ(νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πki ,...,πK
∗)

-νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πki ,...,πK
∗)

with

) / (σ(νk

(π0∗ ,π1∗ ,π2∗ ,...,πki ,...,πK
∗ )max

)+

)), where σ is the standard deviation.This indicates the overlap of

reward spectrum given by compared strategy profiles for the player k.
The time complexity of finding the prescribed strategy for the ²-ANE would be to
polynomial with the number of strategies and the number of players in the game.1
Since the practicality of security situation does neither provide too numerous distinct
line of engagements nor any advantage in confusing act randomly with wilder or finer
probability distribution over the action space, the dependence on the number of
distinct strategies would not be prohibitory.
The space complexity will be polynomial with the number of strategies and the
number of players in the game. The average expected reward and the standard
deviation for each strategy profile must be evaluated and stored for mutual
comparison. Thus it will be polynomial with number of strategies and number of
players.
The time complexity of evaluation of average reward for a strategy profile is
polynomial with the number of strategies, depth of game tree decided by discount
factor β and the threshold discount. The space complexity is linear with number of
1

Each player is assumed to be having same number of strategies. If they are not equal, the number of
strategies of the player with the highest number is valid.
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strategies and the number of runs, as one reward value for each strategy in each run is
used to compute the average.
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